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NOTES
PREDATORY PRICING: THE RETREAT FROM THE AVC RULE
AND THFS"SEARCH FOR A PRACTICAL ALTERNATIVE*
The antitrust concept of predatory pricing has been defined' as "behavior
that involves a reduction of price in the short run so as to drive competing firms
out of the market or to discourage entry of new firms in an effort to gain larger
profits via higher prices in the long run than would have been earned if the price
reduction had not occurred." 2 Despite this simple definition, courts historically
have experienced difficulty in identifying predation due to lack of a widely
accepted or clearly delineated legal standard.' Early courts addressing
predatory pricing turned to vague formulae that did not provide an objective
standard by which to analyze the offense. 4 Examples of this subjective analysis
were evident where courts referred to "ruinous competition"' or "predatory
intent" 6 when adjudicating liability. Several courts, when discussing predation,
used the phrase "below-cost" pricing, but never defined it in unambiguous
economic or accounting terminology.' Furthermore, while "below-cost"
• The author, a joint J.D./M.B.A. candidate, would like to acknowledge and thank one
of his professors from Boston College School of Management, Dr. Mary Louise Hatten, for her
helpful comments on the economic principles and the experience curve concept utilized in this
note.
' Although there is no universally accepted definition of predatory pricing, in order to
introduce the concept and give the reader general boundaries for considering the topic, the defini-
tion suggested by a recent commentator will be accepted in this note. See Joskow & Klevorick, A
Framework For Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 213, 219-20 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as Joskow].
2 Id.
See Mt. Lebanon Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 283 F. Supp. 453, 459-60 (W. D. Pa.
1968), aff'd, 417 F.2d 622 (3d Cir. 1969) (discussion of many factors that may be material in a
predatory pricing case, including the size of the firms involved, and any advantage unrelated to
competitive merits such as multi-territorial market or multi-line of commerce); Joskow, supra
note 1, at 219 n.20.
' See Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of The Sherman
Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 698 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Areedal.
5 Porto Rican Am. Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 234, 236 (2d Cir.
1929), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 858 (1929) (Ruinous competition brought about by lowering prices
was an illegal medium of eliminating weaker competition).
6 See Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 335 F.2d 47, 52-53 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
906 (1965) (Predatory intent evidenced where respondent, when discussing price cuts, stated
"don't try to follow me. If you do, we will put you out of business.").
' Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Co., 282 U.S. 555, 561 (1931) (Evidence indicated
that respondents sold their goods "below the point of fair profit, and finally, below the cost of
production ."); Greenville Publishing Co. v. Daily Reflector, Inc., 496 F.2d 391, 396-98 (4th Cir.
1974) (Contention that defendant deliberately sold advertisements in his paper below cost to drive
plaintiff's paper out of town adequately described a violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.
Opposing accountant's views of "costs" presented an issue of fact to go to the trier of fact. Beyond
that the ultimate question related to intent.); National Dairy Prod. Corp. v. United States, 350
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pricing was considered severely anti-competitive , 8
 it was not deemed a requisite
element in a finding of predation and by itself was not necessarily illegal.° As a
result of these imprecise standards, neither courts nor businesses had an objec-
tive guideline when attempting to distinguish between legal pricing conduct and
illegal, anti-competitive pricing conduct. Consequently, as an antitrust tool to
foster competitive practices, the predatory pricing violation was not as effective
as it might have been.
The existence of predation can be used to prove attempted monopolization
in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.'° It is in this context that charges of
predatory pricing most often arise." An attempt to monopolize claim under sec-
tion 2 generally requires that the plaintiff show the relevant market, the
defendant's specific intent to monopolize that market, and a dangerous prob-
ability of success. 12
 The elements, however, are not entirely distinct. The
requirement of a dangerous probability of success can be satisfied by direct proof
of adequate market power to succeed, or can be inferred from proof of specific
intent to monopolize.° Specific intent to monopolize can be inferred from proof
F. 2d 321, 327 (8th Cir. 1965), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 384 U.S. 883 (1966) (Evidence of
predatory intent where National Dairy sold milk at "unreasonably low prices," which were
"below National's cost," for a period of six weeks, even though there was no evidence it was done
to hurt rivals.); E. B. Muller Co. v. FTC, 142 F_2d 511, 517 (fith Cir. 1944) (Statement by
defendant that sales would "mean some loss to us" held to have weight on the question of intent to
eliminate a competitor and on whether sales were actually "below cost."). See also Utah Pie Co. v.
Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967), where the Court found the existence of predatory
conduct, but enunciated no clear standard of predation. Among other factors, price was set at
"less than its direct cost plus an allocation for overhead." Id. at 698. Whether this reference to
below-cost pricing was meant as an economic or accounting definition was unclear, yet the Court
did not further clarify this reference to cost.
° Ovitron Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 295 F. Supp. 373, 378 (S.D.N.Y. •1969)
("Pricing below cost is a severely anticompetitive tactic frequently engaged in by corporations
with significant resources to drive weaker competitors from the field.").
9
 Greenville Publishing Co. v. Daily Reflector, Inc., 496 F.2d at 396. See also Pacific
Eng'r & Prod. Co. of Nevada v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790, 796 (10th Cir. 1977) (no
reference to be drawn from sales below total cost).
'° 15 U.S.C. 5 2 (1976). This section provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several states, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and,
on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a
corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars or by imprisonment
not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
" A charge of predation, and, therefore, a focus on predatory pricing, may also arise
under the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act in a primary-line price
discrimination case. 15 U.S.C. SS 12-27 (1976). See, e.g., Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348
U.S. 115, 120 (1954) (Local intrastate price cutting by an interstate baker that drove a local rival
out of business violated the Robinson-Patman Act.). The predatory pricing issues are similar in
the two contexts. Therefore, the analysis of predatory pricing in this note will refer to claims
arising under either of these acts involving predation. See, e.g., International Air Indus., Inc. v.
American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 720 n.10 (5th Cir. 1975) (Robinson-Patman Act case). See
Areeda, supra note 4, at 726-28.
12
 See United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296, 298.99 (8th Cir. 1976).
" California Computer Prods., Inc. v. International Business Machines Corp., 613 F.2d
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of predatory conduct.' 4 Proof of predatory pricing, therefore, could be the key to
proving two elements of a section 2 attempt to monopolize claim.' 5 Specific
intent could be inferred from the predatory conduct, and this in turn could lead
to an inference of a dangerous probability of success . 16
The topic of predatory pricing has become the object of increased concern
over the past five years in both academic literature" and judicial decisions.' 8
This heightened level of interest in the topic, in economic and legal debate, can
be traced directly to an article on the subject by Professors Phillip Areeda and
Donald Turner. 19 The article was the first attempt in legal literature to develop a
per se legal standard designed to distinguish predatory conduct from compet-
itive conduct based solely on cost-price analysis suggested by economic theory. 20
It proposed the Average Variable Cost (AVC) rule in an attempt to establish a
legal test focusing on objective criteria to identify predation. 21 This rule very
simply defined conduct setting price at or above a firm's average variable cost of
727, 737 (9th Cir. 1979). See Swift and Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905) (Intent is
essential to an attempt to monopolize case and is necessary to produce a dangerous probability.
The dangerous probability requirement can therefore be a consequence of intent.).
" See Marquis v. Chrysler Corp., 577 F.2d 624, 641 (9th Cir. 1978). See also FTC v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960) (In a Robinson-Patman case, predatory price cutting
may allow the inference of intent to create a primary-line injury to lessen competition or to create a
monopoly, absent any showing of intent.).
10 Although three elements are generally required to prove an attempt to monopolize: (1)
proof of a relevant market; (2) proof of specific intent; and (3) proof of a dangerous probability of
success, in the Ninth Circuit the first of these elements may not be required, thus making the proof
of predatory pricing even more crucial to proving a section 2 attempt to monopolize. See Hallmark
Indus. v. Reynolds Metal Co., 489 F.2d 8, 12-13 (9th Cir. 1973). Commentators also have ques-
tioned the need to prove relevant market. See, e.g. , Note, Attempt to Monopolize Under the Sherman Act:
Defendant's Market Power as a Requisite to a Prima Facie Case, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1451 (1973); Note,
Prosecutions for Attempt to Monopolize: The Relevance of the Relevant Market, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 110
(1967).
16 Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 585 F.2d 381, 390 (9th Cir. 1978) ("short-cut method" of
establishing liability: proof of dangerous probability of success can be inferred from proof of
specific intent, which in turn can be inferred from a proof of predatory or anticompetitive conduct
which constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade).
'' See Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy for Prevention of Predatory Pricing,
89 YALE L.J. 1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Baurnoll; Joskow, supra note 1; McGee, Predatory Pricing
Revisited, 23 J. On L. & ECON. 289 (1980) [hereinafter cited as McGee]; Scherer, Predatory Pricing
and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Scherer];
Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Williamson].
le See, e.g., Chillicothe Sand & Gravel v. Martin Marietta Corp., 615 F.2d 427 (7th Cir.
1980) (discussed in text and notes at notes 239-55 infra); California Computer Prods., Inc. v.
International Business Machines Corp., 613 F. 2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979) (discussed in text and notes
at notes 204-16 infra); Janich Bros. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978); Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1074 (1977); International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714
(5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976); Transamerica Computer Co. v. International
Business Machines Corp., 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (discussed in text and notes at notes
217-37 infra).
19
 Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of The Sherman Act,
88 HARV. L. REV, 697 (1975).
20 See Joskow, supra note 1, at 213 & n. 1 .
21 See Areeda, supra note 4, at 699-700.
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production as competitive and conduct setting price below this point as pred-
atory. 22 Areeda and Turner limited their examination of predation solely to this
cost-based rule. They preferred this test because it provided an objective basis
for the courts to analyze the offense . 23
Almost immediately after its proposal, the Areeda and Turner approach
gained quick acceptance in several courts. 24 After repeated academic criticisms
and counter-proposals,25 however, courts more recently have indicated a reluc-
tance to apply the rule in all cases. 26 In at least one instance a court has explicitly
rejected the Areeda/Turner approach as incorrect when applied to most cases of
alleged predatory pricing. 27 As a result of this retreat from the AVC rule, wide-
spread disagreement now again exists over the correct test for a court to apply
when examining allegations of predation.
It is the purpose of this note to examine the Areeda/Turner approach and
its judicial treatment. This examination will show that recent courts are correct
in expressing reluctance to adopt the AVC rule because it fails to consider
several factors that are essential to making a reasoned finding of predatory
pricing. Once these overlooked factors have been identified, through a review of
the rule and a look at proposed theoretical alternatives, this note will present a
test for predation that attempts to integrate all of the appropriate considerations.
The note begins by defining various economic cost concepts underlying the
AVC rule. These concepts are then incorporated into a discussion of the various
cost-price relationships Areeda and Turner analyzed in their development of the
rule. The second section contains an examination of problems with the AVC
rule and its application in the courtroom. Included in this examination are
recent cases indicating a judicial retreat from the AVC rule. The third section of
this note consists of an analysis of two contrasting, theoretical alternatives to the
Areeda/Turner approach. The final section is devoted to an enumeration of sev-
eral characteristics that should be embodied in a valid legal standard of
predatory pricing followed by a proposed two-step test for determining
predation.
I. THE AVC RULE: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT WORKS
The AVC rule" represented the first legal approach to predatory pricing
based on an analysis of economic costs. Areeda and Turner attempted to estab-
lish a legal standard capable of clear and correct delineation of predatory
conduct. 29 After examining the topic, they concluded that predatory pricing was
22 Id. at 733.
23 Id. at 698, 699.
24 See Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d at 1358; International Air Indus., Inc. v.
American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d at 720 n.10.
25 See note 17 supra.
26 See California Computer Prods., Inc. v. International Business Machines Corp., 613
F.2d at 743.
27
 See Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Business Machines Corp,, 481 F.
Supp. at 995.
28 Areeda, supra note 4, at 733.
29 Id. at 698.
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an infrequent occurrence." Therefore, a major consideration in their formula-
tion of the rule was to minimize the threat of litigation in order to avoid detering
legitimate, competitive pricing. 31 As long as courts continued to apply "empty
formulae" based on subjective or vague definitions of the offense, they reasoned
that this threat would remain large.32 Since the likelihood of an actual violation
was small, Areeda and Turner focused on establishing a requirement of specific
and objective data as a way to minimize this threat." The result was a test dis-
tinguishing between predatory and competitive conduct based solely on an
analysis of the relationship between a firm's economic costs and its prices. 34
An explanation of the AVC rule requires an understanding of three key
measures of economic cost employed by Areeda and Turner in formlating the
rule. These economic measures were used to designate various levels of price
considered by Areeda and Turner when analyzing predatory conduct. One of
these measures, average variable cost, was utilized as the dividing line between
predation and competition in the courtroom application of their standard." The
remaining two measures, marginal cost and average total cost, were utilized by
them in the economic justification of the rule . 36
All three measures of cost utilized by Areeda and Turner reflect economic
costs. A firm's economic costs can be divided into two categories: fixed and
variable.32 Fixed costs are costs facing a firm that do not vary with output and
cannot change during the period of time under consideration." These costs,
sometimes referred to as overhead, would continue even if the firm produced no
output at all. 39 Examples of fixed costs include the firm's cost of plant and equip-
ment, management services, interest payment on bonded debt, property taxes,
and depreciation . 4° Additionally, economic fixed costs also include the return on
investment or normal profits necessary to attract equity capital to a firm, an
amount not included in an accountant's definition of costs. 41 These costs are
included in the economic definition because they represent payments theoret-
ically necessary to bid capital away from alternative uses. 42 Therefore, they are
considered a cost of doing business, similar to interest payments on debt capital.
In determining any resource's economic cost, the marketplace payment that
would be necessary to bid a resource away from an alternative use is included . 43
3° Id.
" Id. at 699.
32 id .
33 See id. at 698, 699.
34 Id. at 699-700.
" Id. at 733.
36 Id. at 704-16.
37 Id. at 700. See E. MANSFIELD, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS, DECISIONS 121,
436 (1st ed. 19741 [hereinafter cited as MANSFIELD'.
" Id.
" Areeda, supra note 4, at 700.
3° Id. Depreciation is included to the extent that equipment is not consumed by using it in
the production process. Id.
41 Areeda, supra note 4, at 700.
42 MANSFIELD, supra note 37, at 435. See Areeda, supra note 4, at 700.
43 See MANSFIELD, supra note 37, at 435.
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Economists refer to this as the opportunity cost concept." The other type of
economic costs, variable costs, are those costs that are linked directly to the level
of output and can be changed during the time under consideration." Examples
of variable costs include the cost of materials used in production, direct labor,
most indirect labor, fuel, and any other per unit fees such as licensure and
royalties.46
With the distinction between fixed and variable costs in mind, the three
cost measures utilized by Areeda and Turner may be defined in the following
manner. Average total cost (ATC) is the total cost of producing the product
divided by the number of units produced." Total cost is the sum of all fixed and
variable costs that are required to operate the entire production process."
Average variable cost (AVC) is the sum of all variable costs incurred in pro-
duci-. g. the product divided by the number of units produced." Marginal cost is
the increase in total cost, or the incremental cost, resulting from production of
the last unit of output. 5° Since variable costs are the only costs that change with
different levels of output, marginal cost is solely a function of additional variable
cost incurred due to production of the last unit of output." Areeda and Turner
relied on these three measures of economic cost in their development of a legal
standard of predation. In their comparison of a firm's price relative to cost, the
examination of price set equal to these measures of cost proved to be either
theoretically or practically useful in determining the existance of predatory
pricing.
A. Development of the Areeda/Turner AVC Rule:
Relationships Between Price and Economic Costs
Areeda and Turner developed the AVC rule in an attempt to formulate a
meaningful and workable test to determine the existence of predation. 52 They
began by attempting to discover the theoretical point at which price, in relation
44 Id.
45 See MANSFIELD, supra note 37 at 121. Determination of costs as fixed or variable is a
function of time. Over a long enough time period, all inputs and, therefore, all costs are variable,
because everything including plants and equipment could be purchased or sold. Thus, the period
of time relevant to classify costs as variable or fixed is the short run. Short run is defined as the
period of time in which the firm cannot replace, increase, or decrease its plant and equipment.
Areeda, supra note 4, at 701.
46 Id. at 700.
47 MANSFIELD, supra note 37, at 439.
48 Id. at 436-38.
+9 Areeda, supra note 4, at 700. See MANSFIELD, supra note 37, at 439.
5° Areeda, supra note 4, at 700. See MANSFIELD, supra note 37, a: 141.
" Areeda, supra note 4, at 700. If variable costs were strictly proportional to output,
marginal cost would equal AVC at all outputs. Id. at 700 n.13. In most situations, however,
variable costs will not be strictly proportional to output and marginal cost will then be lower than
AVC at some outputs and higher than AVC at other outputs. Id. For example, labor is a variable
cost. Once it becomes necessary to employ a set workforce over time periods such as an hour or
week, this workforce may be able to turn out additional output in that period without requiring
• any additional labor cost. In this situation the additional cost for the last unit of output would only
be the cost for the added materials used, and marginal cost will be less than AVG.
" Id. at 699.
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to cost, became predatory." Then, once they discovered this relationship, they
sought a practical measure to approximate the theoretical point they had dis-
covered. In explaining their theoretical point, Areeda and Turner initially con-
sidered three situations: where price was set equal to or above ATC; where price
was set below ATC but equal to or above marginal cost; and where price was set
below marginalncost. 54 Each of these situations is discussed below, followed by
an examination of how Areeda and Turner converted their theoretical conclu-
sions into a practical rule.
1. Price Greater Than or Equal to ATC
Where price was set equal to or above a firm's reasonably anticipated"
average total cost, Areeda and Turner concluded that pricing conduct was non-
predatory and therefore lawful." They reasoned that administrative problems
of distinguishing predatory pricing from competitive pricing at any point above
ATC were too great," and that attempts to draw this distinction above ATC
would increase the likelihood of higher prices. 58 A firm that set price above the
product's ATC would be making, by economic cost definition, at least normal
profits on its investment. 59 Total revenues generated by the product covered
total economic costs, placing the firm at or above its "breakeven" point." So
long as the firm was making normal or excess profits from the product, Areeda
and Turner concluded illegal conduct should not be found. 6' Although a firm
may have been foregoing higher profits, it was not losing money on the product
and was covering all costs associated with production." Areeda and Turner
viewed pricing at or above ATC as competition on the merits, since only less
efficient firms, those with higher costs, would be driven from the market."
In their discussion of prices at or above ATC, Areeda and Turner acknowl-
edged two examples of pricing that might be predatory. First, a monopolist
could set prices at or above ATC yet still be foregoing monopoly profits that
could be achieved by pricing at a higher profit-maximization point. 64 This con-
duct, known as limit pricing, makes the market less attractive to new entrants
than it otherwise would be if prices were higher," and acts as a barrier to entry.
55
 Se Areeda, supra note 4, at 701-03.
54 See id. at 703-16.
" Reasonably anticipated costs are relevant throughout this discussion of the Areeda/
Turner approach, since it is necessary to show not only the relation of prices to immediate costs but
also to costs that the producer "reasonably anticipated he would attain within a reasonable period
of time" at the time of the price reduction. Id. at 715.
56 Id. at 732-33.
57 Id. at 707-08.
58 Id. at 708.
59 Id. at 704.
6° Id.
61 Id. at 704-05.
" See id. at 704 & n.20.
63 Id. at 706-07.
64 Id. at 704-05.
65 Id. at 705-06.
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Second, a monopolist could make temporary reductions to ATC in order to dis-
courage new competition. 66 In this instance, the monopolist normally may be
pricing far above ATC, charging whatever the market will bear. 67 When a new
entrant appears ready to enter the market, however, the monopolist will reduce
its prices to ATC to discourage entry by the potential competitor. 68 This strategy
would be employed where barriers to entry, such as start up costs, are high. 60
Due to the investment required, this new price level would not be high enough to
allow the new entrant to justify the initial outlay or to cover expenses of its
facilities at the lowered level of return. 70 The result would scare off potential
competitors or force new entrants out of the market. Then, left alone in the
market, the monopolist would raise prices to the previous leve1. 7 '
While recognizing these situations, Areeda and Turner did not advocate
combatting them. 72 A rule prohibiting either of these practices, by requiring a
higher price floor in certain situations, they argued, would be impossible to
implement." On one hand, they reasoned it would make no legal sense to
propose a standard to forbid limit pricing, because this would compel a firm to
invite entry by exploiting consurners. 74 On the other hand, a standard for-
bidding temporary reductions would be very difficult to administer due to the
necessity of distinguishing between legitimate post-reduction increases and
improper ones. 75 Although resumption of pre-reduction price levels would not
be permitted, adjustments in the price to cope with changes in cost or demand
would have to be allowed." This would result in a continuous administrative
supervision of pricing conduct, a burden Areeda and Turner concluded was not
justified by the "speculative" benefit that such a rule might bring. 77
The difficulty in differentiating between these instances of predation and
competitive pricing would be substantial where prices were set at or above ATC.
As a result, Areeda and Turner designated pricing conduct that covers ATC as
legitimately competitive. Their examination, therefore, goes no further in
instances where the alleged predator's price generates at least normal profits."
2. Price Less Than ATC, but Greater Than or Equal to Marginal Cost
The second price-cost relationship analyzed by Areeda and Turner was
where a firm set price below ATC, but equal to or above its reasonably
66 Id. at 706.
67 See MANSFIELD, supra note 37 at 484.
69 Areeda, supra note 4, at 706.
69 Id. These barriers consist of the large investment in facilities, personnel training,
distribution development, or product promotion necessary to produce and sell the product. Id.
7° Id.
7 ' See id.
" Id. at 704-05.
73 See id. at 706-09.
76 Id. at 706 n.26.
" Id. at 707.
16 Id. at 708.
" Id. at 709.
76 Id.
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anticipated marginal cost. At this level too, Areeda and Turner deemed the
pricing conduct non-predatory and, therefore, lawful." Their justification of
this approach was primarily based on their view of efficiency. According to this
view, pricing at a level equal to or above marginal cost eliminated or dissuaded
from entry only less efficient firms, or equally efficient firms with less capital."
This outcome was regarded as competitively and socially optimal, because
resources would be allocated to their most efficient use when a less efficient firm
stopped production. 8' Though acknowledging that in some cases an equally
efficient firm with less capital might also be destroyed." Areeda and Turner
allowed this situation to stand for administrative reasons." These reasons
included the difficulty of trying to determine and enforce a higher price floor, as
well as the likelihood that a higher floor would allow not only equally efficient
firms, but also less efficient firms, to survive. 84 On this basis Areeda and Turner
concluded that prohibition of any price set at or above marginal price could not
be justified on economic or administrative grounds." As a result, they desig-
nated conduct setting prices that at least covered marginal cost as non-
predatory. Indeed, they considered price set equal to marginal cost optimal,
allowing no less-efficient firms to remain in the market.
3. Price Less Than Marginal Cost
The final price-cost relationship analyzed by Areeda and Turner was where
a firm set price below reasonably anticipated marginal cost. This pricing con-
duct was deemed by them to be predatory and, therefore, unlawful." Where
price equaled or exceeded marginal cost, Areeda and Turner reasoned that firms
would be destroyed or dissuaded from entry on the basis of efficiency and
optimization of the social allocation of resources. Where, however, price fell
below marginal cost these reasons were no longer the cause of the destruction
and dissuation." When prices were below marginal cost, at least some units
were sold at an out-of-pocket loss." The revenue received for a unit would not
cover the additional variable cost of producing the last unit of output. Thus,
where price was set below marginal cost, aggregate losses increased as produc-
tion rose." Areeda and Turner concluded that by pricing at this level a firm
79 Id. at 733.
'1° See id. at 709-11. Areeda and Turner equated the term "staying power" with capital
reserves or the financial ability to absorb the losses incurred at selling below ATC. Id.
81 Id. at 711.
82 Id. at 710.
83 Id. at 711.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 711-12.
86 Id. at 733. The single exception to this rule would be where price, though below mar-
ginal cost, is at or above ATC. This only occurs where demand is straining capacity and the firm is
producing at a level beyond minimum AVC. A situation like this was believed by Areeda and
Turner to be unlikely to have any anti-competitive effects and, therefore, would not be deemed
predatory so long as price was equal to or above ATC. Id. at 712-13.
" Id. at 712.
86 Id.
89 Id. The firm could eliminate these losses by reducing production, or ceasing
production altogether. Id.
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incurred private losses, wasted social resources, and "greatly increase[d] the
possibility that rivalry will be extinguished or prevented for reasons unrelated to
the efficiency of the monopolist ." 9° Only firms with sufficient capital resources
to sustain increased losses with every unit sold would remain in the market. Fur-
thermore, these short run losses would only be incurred with the belief that
rivals would not be able to continue production, thereby eliminating
competition in the hope of future increased prices and profit that would more
than offset immediate losses. As a result, Areeda and Turner designated conduct
setting price below marginal cost as conclusive evidence of illegal predatory
pricing. 91
Marginal cost thus was determined to be the theoretical point below which
price becomes predatory. 92 Areeda and Turner noted that price equal to
marginal cost produces an efficient allocation of resources under perfect compe-
tition." Therefore, they considered that any decrease in price to the level of
marginal cost or approaching this point would result in improved resource
allocation . 94 Areeda and Turner concluded, however, that there could be no
legitimate reason for pricing below this point." For these -reasons, conduct
would not be considered predatory unless it resulted in pricing below marginal
cost.
4. From Theory to Practice: AVC as a Surrogate for Marginal Cost
Although Areeda and Turner viewed marginal cost as the economically
sound point at which to distinguish between competitive and predatory pricing
conduct, they concluded that its use as a legal standard was impractical."
Marginal cost is not an accounting cost and, thus, cannot be determined from
conventional business records. 97 Since marginal cost is strictly an economic con-
cept, a rule relying on marginal cost determination could not be applied, as a
practical matter, in the overwhelming majority of cases addressing predation.
Areeda and Turner concluded, therefore, that the administrative impediment to
using a marginal cost rule necessitated finding a surrogate to approximate
marginal cost."
Areeda and Turner chose average variable cost as their surrogate for
marginal cost. 99 They chose AVC primarily because a figure representing AVC
could be determined from normal business records'" and because they con-
cluded that AVC approximated marginal cost in most instances.'°' Areeda and
9U Id.
41 Id. at 733.
42 Id. at 716.
42 Id. at 702.
" Id. at 703.
" See id. at 712.





'°' Areeda and Turner noted that the use of AVC would raise no difficulties when the two
measures were "identical over the relevant range of output." Id. at 717 & n.42.
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Turner acknowledged, however, that the two costs were not always the same. 1 °2
At low levels of production, variable cost per unit decreases as output increases,
and as a result marginal cost is less than AVC . 1" Conversely, at high levels of
production variable cost per unit increases as output nears capacity, and
marginal cost is greater than AVC . 1" Only in the middle range of production
levels, where AVC is at its minimum, are marginal cost and AVC closely
comparable.
In addressing these differences, Areeda and Turner concluded that the
AVC standard was the "correct test on principle" where AVC exceeded
marginal cost because a firm pricing below AVC would incur fewer losses by
ceasing production.'" It would be unusual for a firm to have such a pricing
policy absent a predatory intent. Where AVC is less than marginal cost, the
deviation from a marginal cost standard originally was permitted by Areeda and
Turner due to their belief that predatory pricing rarely occurred and that the
likelihood of predation was even less when capacity was strained.' 66 This likeli-
hood was less because the loss of profits would be great due to the act of fore-
going higher prices on the very large volume being sold, and new demand result-,
ing from driving a rival out of business could not be met since production was
already nearing capacity.'67 In this range of output, however, the deviation of
AVC and marginal cost becomes progressively greater as production increases
beyond the point of minimum AVG.'" Therefore, AVC becomes a progres-
sively less satisfactory surrogate for their theoretical division between predation
and competition, marginal cost.'" Areeda and Turner subsequently qualified
their standard in this area, concluding that a defendant should only be permited
to rely on the AVC standard in this instance if some evidence was offered to
indicate that AVC was not significantly below marginal cost."°
As a result of the substitution of AVC for marginal cost, the following
standard emerged as the AVC rule, (1) a price set equal to or above reasonably
anticipated average variable cost is non-predatory, and such pricing conduct is
lawful, (2) a price set below reasonably anticipated average variable cost is
predatory, and such pricing conduct is unlawful." The AVC rule represented a
1 " Id.
1 " Id.
'°* Id. The phenomenon of marginal cost rising above AVC can be demonstrated by
examining one variable cost: direct labor. Plant capacity may be achieved only through the use of
three shifts per day. In order to employ labor for the third shift, however, the firm would have to
pay a shift differential. In this regard the direct labor cost of producing units in the third shift
would be higher than that of the first shift. Thus, the marginal cost of the last unit produced in the
third shift will be greater than the AVC of the product. This higher cost of producing the third shift
units would then raise overall AVC, though not as high as the marginal cost.
105 id.
'" Id. at 718.
107 Id.
1" Williamson, supra note 17, at 337 n.129.
'°9 Id.
"° Areeda & Turner, Williamson On Predatory Pricing, 87 YALE L.J. 1337, 1338 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Areeda II].
"' Areeda, supra note 4, at 733.
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per se approach to predatory pricing." 2 Due to Areeda and Turner's conclusion
that a standard relying on the existance of such factors as predatory intent pro-
vided little basis for analyzing the offense," their standard for determining
predatory pricing relied entirely on an examination of the defendant's price-cost
relationship."4
B. Rationale for Adoption of the AVC Rule
in a response to academic criticism, which began soon after publication of
the original article," Areeda and Turner in a subsequent article stated four
major reasons for adopting their approach."' First, they noted that when con-
sidering any predatory pricing rules, the desire to encourage competitive pricing
conduct must be recognized. Therefore, rules adopted for predatory pricing
should seek to avoid frivolous suits that may have the effect of chilling legitimate
competition through the threat of litigation."' The requirement of showing price
below AVC would deter suits where the objective data did not support such a
showing. This rule would do away with vague formulations of the offense and
delineate a clear cut standard of predation."' Also, this would enable firms to
base decisions upon a recognizable standard without the fear that competitive
pricing would draw suits under section 2 of the Sherman Act." 9
Second, a price set equal to AVC, a surrogate for short run marginal cost,
would employ resources in the socially optimal manner, maximizing social
welfare.'" A price equal to marginal cost would be the result under perfect
competition, so any downward change in price levels up to this point would be
an improvement over normal monopoly pricing.' 2' The AVC rule encourages
this type of downward change by defining only conduct that reduced prices
below average variable cost as predatory. 122
Third, any rule that established a price floor above marginal or average
variable cost would harm competition based on efficiency by preserving ineffi-
cient rivals or attracting inefficient entry.'" Under the AVC rule, however, only
12 Apt,. se approach was defined by the Supreme Court in Northern Pacific Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), where the Court stated:
[There are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect
on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be un-
reasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm .they
have caused or the business excuse for their use.
Id. at 5.
13 Areeda, supra note 4, at 699.
14 See id. at 699-700.
Williamson, supra note 17; see also Scherer, supra note 17; Scherer, Some Last Words on
Predatory Pricing, 89 HARV. L. REV. 901 (1976); and Williamson, Williamson on Predatory Pricing II,
88 YALE L. J. 1183 (1979).
16 See Areeda II, supra note 110, at 1339.
Id.
"8 See Areeda, supra note 4, at 698.
19 See id. at 699.
120 Id .
121 Areeda, supra note 4, at 703.
122 See id. at 733.
423 See Areeda II, supra note 110, at 1339.
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equally or more efficient firms would remain if prices were reduced to the
minimum legal level. Entry by all firms except those anticipating to be more effi-
cient would be dissuaded. 124
Finally, Areeda and Turner noted that effective legal rules must concen-
trate on short run, observable eonsequences. 125 Areeda and Turner admitted
equally efficient firms might be destroyed or dissuaded from entry under the
AVC rule. This destruction would cause long run welfare costs potentially
exceeding short run gains. They contended, however, that long run conse-
quences were speculative or estimated.'" Such immeasurable or indeterminate
factors could not be adequately incorporated into an effective legal rule."'
II. QUESTIONING THE AVC RULE
The AVC rule was applied in the courtroom not long after publication of
the Areeda/Turner article.'" In the subsequent four years almost every court
addressing the issue of predatory pricing either applied or favorably commented
on the AVC rule. These courts included the courts of appeals for the Fifth,' 29
Ninth,"° and Tenth"' circuits as well as numerous district courts, primarily in
the Ninth Circuit.' 32 Courts applying the AVC rule relied heavily on the
Arreda/Turner article to provide theoretical support, rather than attempting to
provide their own analysis of the validity of the approach. 133 Nevertheless,
almost as soon as courts first accepted the AVC rule, the identification of
problems with the approach began. Even during the initial period of judicial
acceptance, commentators expressed criticism about the manner in which
Areeda and Turner applied economic theory. 134 Meanwhile, as courts continued
124 Areeda, supra note 4, at 711.
125 See Areeda II, supra note 110, at 1339.
126 Id.
1 " Id.
"8 International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976). See generally Comment: An Appraisal of Marginal Cost and
Predatory Pricing Under Section 2 of The Sherman Act, 30 ALA. L. REV, 562 (1979).
128 International Air Indus., Inc., v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.
1975).
13° Janich Bros. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 829 (1978); Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1074 (1977).
131 Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. of Nevada v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977).
132 Foremost Int'l Tours, Inc. v. Quantas Airways Ltd., 478 F. Supp. 589 (D, Hawaii
1979); California Steel and Tube v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 469 F. Supp. 265 (C.D. Cal. 1979);
William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 461 F. Supp. 410 (N.D. Cal.
1978); ILC Peripherals v. International Business Machines Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal.
1978); Murphy Tugboat Co. v. Crowley, 454 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Weber v. Wynne,
431 F. Supp. 1048 (D. N.J. 1977). Contra, Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Business
Machines Corp. 481 F. Supp 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979); 0. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 472 F.
Supp. 793 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
'" E. G. , Janich Bros. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d at 856-58; International Air
Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d at 723-24.
134 See Scherer, supra note 17; Williamson, supra note 17.
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to accept the AVC rule, other problems with the approach became evident.
Recently, several courts have retreated from the earlier across-the-board
acceptance of the AVC rule.
A. Problems with the AVC Approach to Predatory Pricing
As the AVC rule and the implications of its application to actual business
situations are examined, various problems arise. These problems can be
grouped into four general categories: (1) problems stemming from the divergent
policy considerations behind the Sherman Act and the AVC rule, (2) problems
with ascertaining and using AVC, (3) theoretical criticisms of the concepts
Areeda and Turner relied on to support their approach, and (4) judicial mis-
conception and misapplication of the AVC rule and its consequences.
1. Divergent Policy Considerations
The AVC rule tends to undermine certain salutary features of federal
antitrust policies. While the Sherman Act places primary emphasis on
competition, the AVC rule only emphasizes economic efficiency. These con-
siderations are not always consistent. On one hand, the AVC rule encourages
pricing conduct that destroys or dissuades less efficient competition,'" indicat-
ing that survival of inefficient firms is undesireable. On the other hand, courts
have recognized that Congress, in enacting the Sherman Act, appreciated that
firms with higher costs may well warrant protection in the interests of competi-
tion. 136
 Federal antitrust policies place great emphasis on competition from as
many sources as possible, including new entrants and smaller rivals.'" New
entrants and small producers, however, face higher costs than large or
established firms.'" The AVC rule allows the large or established firms to price
below their breakeven point, ATC, and well below the corresponding breakeven
point for the small or new firms. Thus, the AVC rule seriously threatens the
ability of the new or smaller producer to survive.
Societal benefits from the AVC rule and the Sherman Act are different. The
AVC rule, consistent with its emphasis on economic efficiency, aims for optimal
resource allocation and the resulting low consumer price achieved where price is
set equal to marginal cost.' 39
 But the Sherman Act, due to social and political
considerations, instead emphasizes decentralization even at the expense of
higher consumer prices that this might entail.'" The social and political motiva-
tions behind the Sherman Act indicate a fear of excessive economic power con-
centration more than they do the desire for optimal resource allocation.'"
The economic concepts underlying the AVC rule focus solely on cost data,
excluding the intent factors relevant to federal antitrust policies. Areeda and
135 See Areeda, supra note 4, at 711.
'" See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
1 " Id. See generally Sullivan, Economics and More Humanistic Disciplines: What Are the Sources
of Wisdom for Antitrust?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1214 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Sullivan].
'99 R. CAVES, AMERICAN INDUSTRY: STRUCTURE, CONDUCT, PERFORMANCE 24-29 (2d
ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as CAVES].
199 Areeda, supra note 4, at 711.
14° See note 136 supra.
141
 See generally Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV, 1051 (1979).
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Turner ignore intent, concluding it provides an insufficient basis for analysis of
predatory pricing. 142 They rely exclusively on economic cost data to indicate the
existence of predation.'" While objective cost data may be all that is required to
solve what is strictly an economic problem, predation is not strictly an economic
problem. It is a violation of the Sherman Act. Predatory pricing involves a price
reduction with,,,the aim of driving competitors out of business, so as to enjoy
larger profits in the long run.'" Proof of predatory pricing may be used to infer
the specific intent required as part of an attempt to monopolize case.'" Thus, an
examination of the intentions or reasons behind management's decision to make
the price reduction is relevant in identifying predation. These reasons either
may be legitimate and legal justifications based on the business situation at hand
or they may not be, and evidence on intent well may help the court to make this
determination.'" It may be true that any decision to price below AVC is neces-
sarily predatory, as fewer losses would ensue from completely halting produc-
tion, 147 but this does not mean that a price reduction to some higher level that
also entails losses might not also indicate predation. The Areeda/Turner
approach, however, operates to nullify other evidence of intent where price is
above AVC . 1 "
Due to its exclusion of evidence of intent, as well as lack of emphasis on
social and political considerations of federal antitrust policy, the AVC rule is an
inadequate basis for identifying a violation of the Sherman Act. The rule is too
rigid an approach for legal identification of predation. For instance Areeda and
Turner are willing to allow equally efficient competitors to be destroyed because
of the administrative problems entailed in eliminating this risk.'" The Sherman
Act, however, makes no allowance for destruction of competition simply
because of administrative difficulty.'" While a cost-based cutoff may be helpful
in focusing the court's attention on an objective test that provides some guide-
lines, the Areeda/Turner approach results in a standard devoid of the flexibility
required to analyze predation as a violation of the Z,herman Act. 15 '
2. Problems in the Use of Average Variable Cost
The use of average variable cost as the point delineating legal pricing
conduct ignores problems in determining AVC and in comparing firms with dif-
142 Areeda supra note 4, at 699.
' 43 Id. at 699-700, 733.
' 44 See text and notes at notes 1-2 supra.
145 See note 14 supra.
146 See Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Business Machines Corp., 481 F.
Supp. at 996.
347 See MANSFIELD, supra note 37, at 456; Areeda supra note 4, at 702 n.17.
' 1" See Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. of Nevada v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790 (10th
Cir. 1977). The district court had found the defendant guilty of violating section 2 of the Sherman
Act and section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act based on evidence of intent. Id. at 792-95. The
court of appeals, however, applied the AVC rule and found price to be above AVC but below
ATC. Based on this finding and factors indicating the industry was in decline, the court reversed,
placing no weight on the other evidence of intent. See id. at 797, 799.
' 49 Areeda, supra note 4, at 711.
"° Chillicothe Sand & Gravel v. Martin Marietta Corp., 615 F.2d at 432.
'' .See generally Sullivan, supra note 137.
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fering cost structures. This section will discuss realistic business situations
where use of the AVC rule would result in an inaccurate analysis of predation
resulting in similar firms receiving inconsistant legal treatment. First, figures
expressing AVC can be imprecise, therefore, use of the AVC rule will not result
in uniform legal treatment of similar firms. Any figure for AVC can be no more
precise than the identification and allocation of variable costs. Neither the
identification of costs as variable, nor their subsequent allocation among
products is subject to uniform inter-firm treatment. Any resulting figure for
AVC is affected by arbitrary management decisions. The determination of some
costs as either variable or fixed is discretionary on the part of management.'"
Further, even assuming uniform definitions of fixed and variable costs, a cost
that is variable for one firm may be fixed for another. For example, a long-term
contract with a supplier may obligate a firm to purchase a set amount of
materials regardless of production level, while a rival may purchase the item
more frequently only in the amount required for a specific production level. In
the first instance the obligated amount is a fixed cost, while the second firm's
cost varies with production. Thus, management decisions, to some extent, can
influence what costs are fixed and what costs are variable to the particular firm.
Should management foresee potential predatory pricing problems, these
decisions could be made with the aim of developing very low AVC figures for
particular products.
Second, two firms, incurring the same total costs, could have dissimilar
AVC figures and, thus, be treated differently under the Areeda/Turner
approach for the purpose of identifying predatory pricing. A firm that is highly
automated may incur large fixed costs for equipment and low variable costs for
labor. Its rival, facing the same level of total costs, may be labor intensive and,
therefore, may incur larger variable costs for labor and smaller fixed costs.
Under the AVC rule the former firm could price much lower than the latter firm,
even though both face the same breakeven point. The AVC rule takes no
account of varying cost structures facing the firms when it looks solely to AVC in
determining predation. The firms described above could both price at the same
level, yet one would be guilty of predation while the other would be innocent.
Because of this problem and because of the management decisions that impact
variable cost determination noted above, the use of AVC as the cutoff identify-
ing predation raises serious problems.
3. Theoretical Economic Criticisms
The theoretical analysis Areeda and Turner used to support their rule is
inaccurate in several respects. Their use of AVC as a surrogate for economic
marginal cost raises problems, as does their reliance on marginal cost-pricing.
Additionally, their attempts to characterize the concepts of welfare maximiza-
tion and efficiency in short run cost terms is questionable.
First, while Areeda and Turner utilized economic costs in their theoretical
search for the correct cutoff between competition and predation, they were
forced to rely on an accounting cost in the practical application of their rule.
152 See R. ANTHONY & J. REECE, ACCOUNTING: TEXT AND CASES 504 (6th ed. 1979)




Even if economic theory supports the use of AVC, economic costs are not the
same as accounting costs. On one hand, an economist's cost measures the
marketplace value of an item, its current value in its most valuable alternative
use.'" On the other hand, an accountant's cost measures the historical out-of-
pocket cost of an item, the expense incurred at the time the item was acquired.'"
These two conceptions of cost are different, especially where the value of an item
increases, or inflation occurs, over the passage of time. In these situations, an
economist's cost will be higher than an accountant's cost for the same item."'
Thus, a theoretical justification based on economic measures of cost would
support the use of a figure higher than the corresponding accounting measure of
cost. For this reason it is inaccurate to rely on accounting costs to apply the AVC
rule, which was justified on a theoretical economic analysis.
Second, theoretical support for the use of marginal cost as a cutoff does not
support the substitution of AVC for marginal cost as the cutoff. As noted earlier,
AVC is not the same as marginal cost.'" AVC is equal to marginal cost at only
one point, minimum AVC,'" and Areeda and Turner conceded they knew of no
a priori reason to expect a firm to operate at this point.'" Marginal cost is not
equal to AVC at any other level of output, and it equals or exceeds ATC at
higher levels of output.'" If, indeed, marginal cost is the correct theoretical
cutoff, the substitution of another measure of cost that equals marginal cost at
only one level of production and varies greatly at all other levels is not valid. The
economic analysis supporting marginal cost could only justify the substitution of
AVC for marginal cost at this one point where they are equal. Without some
proof that a firm is operating at minimum AVC, the rationale Areeda and
Turner provide for a marginal cost cutoff .'" is inapplicable to AVC.
Third, the concept of marginal cost-pricing, the theoretical basis for the
Areeda/Turner approach, was derived from an unrealistic model of market
155 MANSFIELD, supra note 37, at 435.
154 ANTHONY, supra note 152, at 27-29.
'55 See id. An example of this would be materials purchased or contracted for at a set price
much earlier than actual production and sale of the products. Also, a labor contract setting wage
rates that was negotiated several years earlier without adequate raises included to keep pace with
inflation would be an example of differing accounting and economic valuation.
156 See text and accompanying notes at notes 102-04 supra.
'" MANSFIELD, supra note 37, at 442. The approximate relationship of marginal cost
(MC) to average total cost (ATC) is shown on the following chart. Marginal cost intersects both






'54 Areeda, supra note 4, at 717.
456
 See Chart I, supra note 157.
' 6° See Areeda, supra note 4, at 709-16.
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conditions. The idea that marginal cost-pricing represented the optimal alloca-
tion of resources was developed from the determination of the optimal
production level for a firm under perfectly competitive market conditions. 16 '
The requirements of this model of perfect competition, 162 however, do not exist
in any real-life market. 163 Moreover, a claim of predatory pricing is likely only to
arise in an industry that varies greatly from perfect competition. A perfectly
competitive market is one where no producer has any influence over setting the
price.'" The firm in this situation faces a market price established for it and
holds such a small share of the market that the firm cannot ever influence the
price .' 65 Predatory pricing, however, could never exist without power over
prices, the underlying assumption being that a firm has in fact reduced the price.
In fact it would seem that only a firm that has significant market power and
financial reserves could even employ the tactic with any hope of success. This
influence over price indicates a market which is far from perfectly competitive.'"
In regard to Areeda and Turner's use of a theory based on the model of perfect
competition, economist Oliver E. Williamson commented, "[c]aution is
warranted where the assumptions on which received doctrine is based are
greatly at variance with the real world circumstances under examination." ' 67
While the perfectly competitive firm has no control over its prices,'" any firm
scrutinized in a predatory pricing case, by definition, has demonstrated control
over its prices. Since the marginal cost-pricing concept is based on perfect
competition and the assumptions underlying perfect competition are not
satisfied in reality, the application of marginal cost-pricing analysis to predatory
pricing is unwise.
Fourth, the AVC rule applies a short-run analysis to long-run welfare
maximization concepts. Areeda and Turner stressed optimal resource allocation
and marginal cost-pricing as a goal by which to judge a firm's pricing conduct.' 69
Their aim was to maximize consumers' welfare by improving resource alloca-
tion and lowering price."° If the AVC rule is followed, however, the welfare loss
in the form of monopoly power in the long run could well exceed any short-run
gain to the consumer through lower prices.'" What may appear to maximize the
welfare of consumers in the short run will not necessarily result in a course of
action in the best interest of society in the long run. Further, Areeda and Turner
emphasize pricing at marginal cost as the way to optimally allocate resources. 12
Marginal cost-pricing, when stated in its long run equation, however, results in
161 MANSFIELD, supra note 37, at 455.
162 Id. at 476.
163 Id. at 477.
164 MANSFIELD, supra note 37, at 476.
163 Id.
166 Economists do not agree on a resource allocation model, or any overall model, for
markets not portraying either the conditions of perfect competition or monopoly, Id. at 505.
16' See Williamson, supra note 17, at 340.
166 MANSFIELD, supra note 37, at 476.
167 See Areeda, supra note 4, at 702-03, 711.
"° Id. at 703.
071 See Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Business Machines Corp., 481 F,
Supp. at 993.
12 See Areeda, supra note 4, at 702-03, 711.
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a price equal to both marginal cost and long-run ATC." 3 AVC is always lower
than ATC, even in the long run. Thus, the welfare maximization argument
stressing optimal resource allocation and marginal cost-pricing, when analyzed
in its proper context, requires a price that covers long-run ATC. Application of
the Areeda/Turner approach, allowing price to equal AVC, will not result in an
optimal allocation of resources over the long run. It is this long run context,
ignored by the AVC rule, that correctly addresses welfare maximization."4
Finally, Areeda and Turner incorrectly viewed short-run costs as the sole
indicator of efficiency. This view is detrimental to firms that have legitimate
short-run cost differences. New entrants face higher costs than established
firms, 15 and small producers face higher costs than larger producers.'m The
Areeda/Turner approach allows firms to price at AVC, but since AVC is below
ATC this implies that a firm pricing at the legal minimum will not cover fixed
costs with the revenue generated by sales of this product." Established and
larger firms are likely to have the capital to cover these costs, "staying
power," 178 thus enabling them to price below ATC. New entrants and smaller
firms, however, are much less likely to possess this "staying power" and, there-
fore, less likely to be able to price below their breakeven point, ATC. As an
additional handicap, fixed costs per unit are likely to be higher for new or
smaller firms. 19 Since these firms cannot realistically price below ATC, the
result of the AVC rule is to allow the established or larger firms, able to price
below ATC, to accentuate their inherent cost advantage. If costs alone are
examined to determine predation, the latter firms can legally lower prices to
their AVC with the goal of driving new or smaller rivals out of the market. In this
respect, the AVC rule ignores predation so long as price remains equal to or
above AVC. By driving these rivals out of the market, the AVC rule does not
give them the chance to increase efficiency and decrease costs, thereby denying
them the chance to become more effective competition in the long run.
Efficiency is not strictly a short run concept; it increases with experience° and
with increased scale.'°' This is particularly true of the new entrant whose
experience and initial production levels are usually minimal. At low levels of
cumulative production, costs decrease more quickly due to experience than they
do at higher levels of cumulative production.' 82 In favoring established and
larger producers, the AVC rule frustrates attempts by new and smaller
producers to realize the benefit of increases in experience and production. This,
therefore, decreases the likelihood that established firms will face efficient,
effective competition in the long run.
'" See P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 470 (10th ed. 1976). Price Marginal Costa Long
Run Average Cost.
"4 See Williamson, supra note 17, at 289.
'" CAVES, supra note 138, at 24-28.
"6 Id. at 108.
'" See Areeda, supra note 4, at 704.
18 See id. at 709.
'" See CAVES, supra note 138, at 26-27.
iao See BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, THE EXPERIENCE CURVE III — WHY DOES IT
WORK? (1974).
1 " CAVES, supra note 138, at 108.
'" See note 342 infra.
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4. Judicial Misconceptions and Misapplication
Courts using the AVC rule have indicated both a misunderstanding of the
concepts implicit in the rule and misapplication of the rule. The misunderstand-
ings stem primarily from the incorrect view that subsidization of a particular
product does not occur at prices above AVC and from an incomplete view of
competition to be eliminated if a firm sets prices equal to AVC. Furthermore, in
at least one instance the misapplication of the AVC rule occurred when rulings
on peripheral issues became dispositive and the court expressed a desire to
benefit consumers over competition.
One misconception that is manifest in some court opinions is that pricing
above AVC means that the firm is not incurring a loss on the sale of its
product.'" Where price is less than ATC, however, losses will be incurred and
subsidization will exist.'" Since AVC is less than ATC, pricing at AVC implies
that a firm is not covering its total costs and, therefore, is suffering a loss on its
sales. International Air Industries, Inc. v. American Excelsior Co.'" provides an
example of a court that did not recognize these losses. The court in International
Air adopted the AVC rule. 1"S In so doing, the court noted that a firm pricing
above AVC would increase net revenues in the short run and, therefore, would
have no need to "subsidize" losses in the relevant market with profits from
other markets.'"
This view of the AVC rule is incorrect. While revenues in this situation may
cover variable expenses, if price is below ATC they would not cover all fixed
expenses such as management salaries or rents. The latter expenses may not be
susceptible to change in the short run, but they are an inevitable cost of
production. If these expenses cannot be covered by revenues from sale of the
product, subsidization from some other source will be required to cover these
costs.
Another misconception held by courts is that only less efficient"' or equally
efficient"' rivals could be driven out of the market. This incorrectly assumes
that more efficient rivals are safe.'" In fact, since any price below ATC neces-
sitates some form of subsidization, more efficient firms with less financial
staying power than the price cutter could be ruined. The more efficient firms
will have, according to Areeda and Turner's view of efficiency, ATC below that
'" See International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.
1975); Weber v. Wynne, 431 F. Supp. 1048, 1060 (D.N.J. 1977). But see Transamerica Computer
Co. v. International Business Machines Corp., 481 F. Supp. at 992.
1 " See Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Business Machines Corp., 481 F.
Supp. at 992. See also Areeda, supra note 4, at 704 n.20.
185 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1975).
186 Id. at 724.
187 Id. at 725. In the related footnote the court observed that absence of such aid from other
markets is a determinative factor in viewing predatory conduct and determining whether a
statutory violation occurred. Id. at 725 n.32. See also Borden Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 175 (5th Cir.
1967).
188 California Computer Prods., Inc. v. International Business Machines Corp., 613 F.2d
727, 743 (9th Cir. 1979).
188
 E. G., International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co. 517 F.2d at 723-24;
Weber v. Wynne, 431 F. Supp. at 1060.
' 9° See International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d at 724. But see
Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Business Machines Corp. 481 F. Supp. at 992.
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of the price cutter, but if the more efficient firm's ATC is above the new price
level, the more efficient firm will incur losses despite its greater efficiency. If it
cannot endure these losses for long, the less efficient price cutter, through
incurring larger losses, merely has to wait until the more efficient firm depletes
its financial reserves and is driven from the market. Courts applying the AVC
rule have not correctly understood this situation.
Misconceptions such as these indicate that the courts have difficulty apply-
ing or analyzing an economic approach such as the AVC rule.' 9' As a result,
cases adopting the AVC rule have developed arguments in support of their
application almost exclusively by quoting at length from Areeda and Turner. 192
Until recently, no court developed any approach of its own based on a review
and synthesis of case law and academic literature.'"
In addition to these misconceptions, at least one court purporting to apply
the AVC rule has misapplied the standard. The court in Foremost Tours, Inc. v.
Qantas Airways'94 avoided a finding of predation by stressing matters unrelated to
the alleged predatory conduct. While acknowledging that subsidization was
occurring, the court found the pricing conduct, which benefited consumers
through lower prices, lawful. 195
191 Perhaps this problem arises because most judges are not economists and may have little
or no economic background. See United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609 (1972)
("The fact is that courts are of limited utility in examining difficult economic problems.").
192 See note 133 supra.
195 Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Business Machines Corp., 481 F. Supp.
965 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
t" 478 F. Supp. 589 (D. Hawaii 1979).
' 95 In Foremost Tours, the court avoided finding prices below AVC based on non-economic
issues: currency conversion rates and "de minimis" administrative costs. Plaintiff, a tour whole-
saler, packaged, promoted, and sold Australian tours through retail travel agencies. Id. at 592.
Defendant, an international air carrier, began to sell tours through one of its divisions. Id.
Foremost filed suit claiming violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 592-93. Among
other allegations, predatory pricing was charged. Id. at 596.
First the plaintiff contended that it was necessary to convert United States dollars into
Australian dollars to compare price with cost. Id. at 599. The court rejected this argument. Id.
Such a conversion would have resulted in the showing of below-AVC pricing in the land tour
operations, id., but the court reasoned that since Qantas spent more in the United States purchas-
ing aircraft and parts than it took in from sales, it could apply the conversion rate applicable to
converting Australian dollars into United States dollars. Id. At this rate the price of the land tour
was above its AVC. Id.
Second, plaintiff argued that Qantas had calculated the cost associated with the land
operations incorrectly, omitting appropriate administrative expenses. Id. at 600. Plaintiff con-
tended when cost was correctly calculated, Qantas had priced the land tours below its AVC. Id.
The court conceded that strictly applying the AVC rule to the land tour operations, Qantas offered
these operations at below AVC, including administrative expenses. Id. Nevertheless, the court
observed that Qantas's primary business purpose in all its operations was to sell seats on its
airplanes, which resulted in considerable profit. Id. at 601. Viewed in this context, and con-
sidering the de minimis significance of the expenses for the land tour operations compared to the
large profits from the air transport operations, the court grouped the two operations together. See
id. at 600-01. This combination resulted in a combined price above AVC. See id. at 601. Plaintiff
argued that allowing this subsidization of the land tour operations by the air transport operations
was contrary to the Sherman Act. Id. The court acknowledged that consideration of the combined
operations would be detrimental to other tour operators but would result in lower prices beneficial
to consumers, whereas consideration of the operations separately would protect tour operators to
the detriment of consumers, due to higher prices. Id. The court justified its grouping of the opera-
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Application of the AVC rule, and misconception of its consequences, in this
manner indicates either a lack of desire to analyze the situation in terms of the
rule, or the lack of background necessary to apply the correct analysis. In either
event, this type of treatment is no more satisfactory a way of determining preda-
tion than was that which occurred prior to the introduction of any economic
cost-based approach. If courts lack the background to either apply or refute
technical economic analysis, they probably should not adopt such an approach
as a legal rule .' 96
In summary, many problems have been encountered in examining the
AVC rule. While attracting criticism on theoretical economic grounds, other
more practical criticisms of the approach also exist. Divergent policy considera-
tions and problems, stemming from the use of average variable cost and judicial
misunderstanding, combine with the theoretical criticisms to keep the AVC rule
from being a viable legal standard for predatory pricing. Although initially the
AVC rule was greeted favorably by the judiciary, recent cases indicate that the
tions on this benefit to consumers and allowed the resulting subsidization of Qantas's land tour
operations. See id. at 601. Therefore, the court gave judgment for the defendant.
In the plaintiff's first argument, conversion rates, not price or cost, became the key issue. The
identical price could be below AVC, and under the AVC rule illegal, when applying one conver-
sion rate and above average variable cost when applying the other rate. This takes the focus off the
crucial issue of the predatory nature of the pricing and puts it on the determination of which
conversion rate to apply. The land tours, a service in Australia, were purchased in the United
States. Yet, because of an unrelated matter, the purchase of aircraft and parti, the conversion rate
applied was that for converting Australian dollars to United States dollars. In so doing the court
avoided finding the defendant's pricing conduct illegal.
In the plaintiff's second argument the court avoided finding a violation of the AVC rule only
by grouping two separate operations together for consideration. The plaintiff's expense allocation
argument was based on the land tour operations alone. See id. at 600. Air transport is necessarily a
separate operation to all tour operators except those which are part of an air carrier. Only air
carriers can provide this service on their own, other tour operators, like Foremost, had to find a
"sponsoring air carrier" to contract with for provision of air transport. Id. at 592. Simply because
Qantas was able to provide both operations through separate divisions is not justification for con-
sidering the two operations together. When the court realized the land tour operations were priced
below average cost, it looked elsewhere for this new classification. The outcome, a subsidization of
the land tour operations, cannot be permitted merely because of the resulting lower prices,
admittedly detrimental to tour operators other than Qantas. This justification could result in cases
that would avoid a finding of predatory pricing, so long as the resultant price was beneficial to
consumers.
This decision was an incorrect application of a legal rule to an alleged instance of predatory
pricing. The focus was not placed on an analysis of the price or pricing conduct. Instead, it was
first placed on the determination of which conversion rate to apply. This determination in turn set
the price level relative to AVC. Whenever there is a fluctuation of the rate, this type of emphasis
could well make the same price predatory at some points in time and not predatory shortly there-
after. This treatment avoids the crucial analysis of the price and the decision which set the price. In
the second instance, the court was incorrect in ignoring the administrative costs as "de minimis"
due to its comparison with profits from other markets. The court was wrong in ignoring these
costs, which if considered would necessitate a different outcome, solely on the basis that the
primary purpose of all Qantas's programs was to sell the profitable plane seats. Id. at 601. This
amounted to outright subsidization of the land tours by the air travel division.
1" This is especially true because of the court's responsibility for giving accurate instruc-
tions to a jury based on the resulting legal rule, or for explaining the rationale of the rule both to
juries and in decisions.
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judicial response to the AVC rule may be changing. Even courts that previously
espoused the AVC rule now seem to be retreating from their earlier stand .' 97
B. Judicial Retreat from the AVC Rule and the Quest for a New Standard
The AVC -rule received almost instant judicial recognition and accept-
ance.'" In the years immediately following its introduction, the only circuits to
address the issue of predatory pricing employed the Areeda and Turner
standard.' 99 Meanwhile, academic criticism of the rule began to mount."° In the
face of this criticism, several courts , 201 the National Commission to Review
Antitrust Laws,202 and the Justice Department"' subsequently questioned the
AVC rule and suggested that alternative approaches to determining predation
be explored and developed.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in California Computer Products, Inc. v.
International Business Machines Corp. 02 4 first indicated a reluctance to apply the
AVC rule in all cases."' In this case the defendant, IBM, was alleged to have
engaged in predatory pricing practices with regard to certain electronic data
processing products . 2 °6 Specifically, these products were disk products, devices
using magnetic disks to store information, and controllers used to communicate
between these disks and the central processing unit (CPU). 207 The plaintiff,
CalComp, was a small computer products manufacturer that produced disk
products compatible with IBM's CPUs. 2" CalComp alleged violations of
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act because of IBM's introduction of new non-
compatible CPUs, its reduction in disk product prices, and its change in market-
ing practices. 209
On the issue of predatory price reductions, the court held that IBM's
197 See text and notes at notes 204-38 infra.
198 See note 128 supra.
' 99 See notes 129-31 supra.
200 See, e.g. , Scherer, supra note 17; Sullivan, supra note 137; Williamson, supra note 17.
2°1 See text and notes at notes 204-55 infra.
2 ° 2 See note 256 infra.
26' See note 258 infra.
204 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979).
205 See id. at 743. Prior to California Computer Products, the Federal Trade Commission in
Borden, Inc., 92 F.T.C. 669 (1978), acknowledged the academic debate over the AVC rule. Id. at
800. In Borden, however, it was unnecessary to apply a new standard for predation since Borden's
conduct was "exclusionary in intent and in effect." Id. at 804. A concurring opinion by Com-
missioner Pitofsky criticized the Areeda/Turner approach. Id. at 817-31. See also 0. Hommel Co.
v. Ferro Corp., 472 F. Supp. 793 (W.D. Pa. 1979). In a decision rendered the same day as
California Computer Products, the court in 0. Hommel Co. specifically declined to adopt the AVC rule.
Id. at 796. See generally Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384, 400 (D. Del. 1978)
(Dismissal of charges where no allegations were made that prices were below cost or that they were
foregoing a profit. No mention was made of a necessity to show prices below AVC even though the
debate between Areeda/Turner and Williamson was cited.).
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pricing conduct was legal since CalComp failed to show that the price reductions
unnecessarily excluded or restricted competition.") It found IBM's conduct to
have been a legitimate response to price competition from other producers like
CalComp . 2" The court noted that evidence presented by IBM indicated the
post-reduction prices were still substantially profitable. 212 Thus, the court
reasoned that IBM's conduct was not predatory. 213 In this case the plaintiff not
only failed to produce evidence of below AVC pricing, but also failed to counter
the evidence introduced by IBM that even after the price reductions the
products remained profitable . 2'4
 Although the court thus was not faced with
facts necessitating a reassessment of the AVC rule, the court observed that
refinement of the AVC rule might be necessary as future predatory pricing cases
arose . 215
 Specifically, the court noted, "we do not foreclose the possibility that a
monopolist who reduces prices to some point above marginal or average
variable cost might still be held to have engaged in a predatory act because of
other aspects of its conduct!' 216
One district court in the Ninth Circuit has read this language as a cue to
retreat further from acceptance of the AVC rule. Indeed, Transamerica Computer
Co. v. International Business Machines Corp. 217
 is the first case to abandon the AVC
rule as the per se standard for identifying predation. In Transamerica, the plaintiff
alleged that IBM monopolized or attempted to monopolize the computer
peripheral equipment market in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. 218 In
response to competition, IBM had reduced substantially the prices of its
products and offered longer and better lease terms for its peripherals. 219
In deciding the case, the court repudiated the AVC rule for most cases
alleging predation. 22° The court took this action because it recognized several of
the deficiencies in Areeda and Turner's approach that are described above.22'
The court noted that it was self-evident that a firm selling below average total
210 Id. at 742.
211 Id .
212
	 id. at 741-42, 743.
211 Id. at 743.
214
212
216 Id. After California Computer Products, in March 1980, the Ninth Circuit in Ernest W.
Hahn, Inc. v. Codding, 615 F.2d 830, 845-46 (9th Cir. 1980), reversed a dismissal of complaints
on the pleadings of a predatory pricing claim where allegations were made of price "below cost"
without any mention of average variable cost. In so doing, the court indicated a willingness to
consider costs other than average variable cost.
217 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
228 Id. at 971-72. Peripheral equipment is a category including disks, tapes, printers, and
terminals that are connected to the central processing unit (CPU). This equipment performs the
functions of storing data for later use, feeding data into the CPU, and accepting data from the
CPU. Id. at 972.
219 Id. at 973.
220 See id. at 995. The jury was unable to reach agreement on any of the issues. Accord-
ingly, pursuant to a pre-trial stipulation, the case was then submitted to the court for a decision.
Id. at 974.
221
 See text at notes 136, 137, 140, 141, 146, 171, 184 & 190 supra.
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cost would incur a loss. 222 It reasoned that even a more efficient rival would
incur a loss if its average total cost was below the price cutter's average total cost
but above the price. 223 In such a situation the more efficient firm would be able
to survive only if it were able to withstand losses as long as the price cutter chose
to inflict them. 224 'The court concluded that under such conditions competition
based on efficiency would be replaced by competition based on wealth.'"
The Transamerica court reasoned if pricing below average total cost was to be
legal, firms able to sustain this price would eliminate competitors through
temporary provision of more and lower priced goods. 226 Instead, the court
noted, Congress and the courts had placed their reliance on effective ongoing
competition from many sources to accomplish proper resource allocation. 227
After discussing this interpretation of the Sherman Act, the court stated:
Areeda and Turner have made a policy judgment. The economic
analysis used to justify that judgment is incomplete, and the judgment
itself stands contradicted by the economic, political, and social policies
of the Sherman Act.
A conclusive presumption of the legality of an unprofitable low
price, merely because it is above marginal cost, a cost which is all but
incapable of proof, would truly be a "defendant's paradise." This
court rejects it. 22B
Thus, the court abandoned the AVC rule as a contradiction of the policies
inherent in the Sherman Act.
To replace the AVC rule, the Transamerica court presented its own economic
cost-based approach to predatory pricing.'" Prices set at or above ATC would
be conclusively presumed legal. 23° Prices set below ATC would be illegal if they
were unreasonable.231 In formulating this approach the court acknowledged it
would be too difficult to distinguish between competitive and anti-competitive
price reductions where price remained above ATC since this determination in-
herently would rely heavily on proof of intent. Therefore, the court stated that
the "minimal threat to competition by a free zone above average cost" was
acceptable. 232 Where prices fell below ATC, however, the court concluded that a
case by case "rule of reason" approach was necessary. 233 The court listed




226 Id. at 994.
227
225 Id. at 995 (footnote omitted).
229 See id. at 990. That the court utilized an economic approach is evident where it defined
average cost as equal to that which covers costs and a normal return on investment.
235 Id. at 989.
291 Id. at 991, 995.
232 Id. at 991.
233 A rule of reason approach focuses on the challenged restraint or practice and its impact
on competitive conditions. The Supreme Court in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433
U.S. 36 (1977), explained the rule of reason standard as follows: "Under this rule, the factfinder
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several examples of situations in which prices set below ATC might be justified.
The primary examples included cases involving: (1) excess capacity in the
industry, (2) decreasing demand, or (3) liquidation of excess merchandise . 234
Where price was below ATC, the court would allow evidence of intent to be
considered in determining the reasonableness of the reduction. 235 In this
situation, evidence of intent could help clarify the nature of the pricing conduct
by revealing whether the price cutter, in its own evaluation of the situation,
thought it was "cutting losses or cutting throats." 236 In applying its approach to
IBM's conduct, the Transamerica court found that the post-reduction prices were
above ATC and, therefore, legal. 2"
Both Ca/comp and Transamerica represent a significant development in the
law of predatory pricing. Since publication of the Areeda/Turner article, courts
in the Ninth Circuit have heard more predatory pricing cases than all the other
circuits combined."' Because of the Ninth Circuit's leading role in this field, the
views expressed in Ca/Comp and Transamerica may well have an impact on future
cases decided in other circuits.
More recently the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in ,Chillicothe Sand &
Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp. 235
 discussed the controversy over the AVC
rule.'" In this case, the plaintiff, Chillicothe Sand & Gravel (CS&G), was a
small producer of road gravel while the defendant, Martin Marietta, was a large
diversified company. 241 As a new entrant to the business , 242 CS&G began
competing vigorously with Marietta for road gravel sales contracts. 243 By pric-
ing below Marietta, CS&G won customers away from the defendant. 244
Marietta responded by cutting its prices . 245 Thereafter, having lost most of its
weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be
prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition." Id. at 49. Earlier, in Chicago
Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), when discussing the rule of reason standard,
the Court noted that "Mlle true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or
destroy competition." Id. at 238.
2" Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Business Machines Corp., 481 F. Supp.
at 996. In some circumstances, the court noted that promotional pricing, meeting competitors
prices, and even occasional price wars could be included. Id.
235 Id.
"6 Id.
" 7 See id. at 996-1002. In reaching this decision, the court reviewed various cost-
accounting methods used by IBM to arrive at a full cost figure. See id. at 998-1001. The methods
used were found to be generally accepted accounting principles, applied consistently, and, there-
fore, valid to establish cost. See id.
"8 See notes 129-32 supra.
239
	 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1980).
24° Id. at 431-32. The court cited Transamerica's divergence from the AVC rule. Id. at 431
n.6.
"i Id. at 428-29.
242 Id. at 429.
243 The court indicated that it was significant CS&G could become a vigorous competitor
in the market after an outlay of only $65,000. Id.
Id.
745 Id. CS&G then raised its prices and simultaneously entered the blacktopping business,
placing itself in direct competition with firms that had been its best customers for road gravel. Id.
at 429-30 n.2.
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road gravel sales contracts to Marietta,'" CS&G sued alleging violations of
section 2 of the Sherman Act. 247 CS&G claimed Marietta's price reduction had
been a predatory attempt to drive it out of business. 248 The district court granted
a directed verdict in favor of the defendant. 249
On appeal, the court noted that while examination of AVC could prove
useful in analyzing predation, 25° it was "willing to consider the presence of other
factors in [its] evaluation of whether or not CS&G has made out a prima facie
case of monopolizing or attempt to monopolize ." 251 The court found that
Marietta's prices were generally above ATC . 252 The court then examined other
evidence of predation in Marietta's conduct. It looked at Marietta's bidding
practices, package pricing, disparagement of CS&G's product, and a statement
that it "wouldn't appreciate" CS&G's entry into the market."' Despite this
examination of additional evidence, the court of appeals nevertheless concluded
that CS&G failed to present sufficient evidence of predatory conduct,254 and it
affirmed the directed verdict.'"
The Chillicothe Sand & Gravel court's willingness to consider evidence
ignored by the AVC rule, coupled with the earlier repudiation of the AVC
approach in Transamerica, suggests a change in judicial attitude toward the
Areeda and Turner approach to predatory pricing.
In addition to this judicial change, both the National Commission to
Review Antitrust Laws and the Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, have
been critical of the Areeda/Turner approach. The Commission concluded that
the AVC rule was "too restrictive" in its exclusion of considerations such as
intent and market power, especially when a dominant firm's conduct was
challenged.256 Further, the Commission recommended the Sherman Act be
amended to include a standard for predation that took intent and market power,
as well as the price-cost relationship, into account."' Shortly after Chillicothe
Sand & Gravel, the Department of Justice, referring to the three decisions
detailed above, indicated it too questioned whether a rigid cost rule, such as the
AVC rule, could "truly reflect market place realities and provide for anticom-
246 Id. at 429-30 & n.3.
242
 Id. at 429.
248 Id. at 431.
249
 Id. at 428.
250
	 at 432.
251 Id. The court cited Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. of Nevada v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551
F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1977), in which the court stated it did not intend to adopt a solely cost-based
approach in the instant case. Id. at 797. The Chillicothe Sand & Gravel court, however, was the first
court to explicitly reject an absolute cost rule by indicating an intent to consider other factors in
evaluating the establishment of a prima facie case. 615 F.2d at 432.
252 Id. The phrase "generally above" is used here because, although all the price figures
presented in the decision were above AVC, in its opinion the court noted, "prices were very close
to and, generally, above average total cost." Id.
2" Id. at 432-33.
254 Id. at 432.
"' Id. at 434.
256
 NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES,
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 149 (Jan. 22, 1979).
2" Id. at 151, 166.
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petitive behavior.' '258
 It noted that conclusive use of a solely cost-based standard
in predatory pricing cases was unwise, and added that the recent trend in these
court decisions was a healthy development . 259
This retreat from the AVC rule comes in the wake of extensive academic
criticism of the Areeda/Turner approach in legal literature. In their discussion of
the AVC rule, courts often have cited academic commentators who have
disagreed with Areeda and Turner. In spite of this, for several years courts
continued to apply the AVC rule. This is not due, however, to a lack of proposed
alternatives to the AVC rule. Almost every academic commentator criticizing
Areeda and Turner's approach on a theoretical basis has proposed his own
theoretical alternative to serve as a legal standard. 26°
III. TWO THEORETICAL ALTERNATIVES TO THE AVC RULE
Since its initial appearance, Areeda and Turner's approach to predatory
pricing has been the subject of constant, critical academic debate . 261 Though
several theoretical alternatives to the AVC rule have surfaced from this ongoing
debate, no court has yet attempted to apply any analysis suggested by the other
commentators. The range of theoretical alternatives can be demonstrated effec-
tively by examining two contrasting approaches. At one extreme, Professor
Sullivan has proposed a predominately non-economic approach,262 while at the
other end of the spectrum Professors Joskow and Klevorick have proposed an
economic approach that differs significantly from the AVC rule. 263
A. A Traditional Non-Economic Approach
Though not proposing that economic or cost analysis should be irrelevant
in predatory pricing cases, Professor Sullivan in response to Areeda and Turner
argued that any strictly economic approach to predation is wrong. 264 This
position stemmed from his systemic view of antitrust law. 265 As a legal system,
Sullivan argued, antitrust regulation is grounded in values other than economic
efficiency and has value sources other than economics.'" These value sources
include concepts drawn from the disciplines of sociology, political science, and
history. 267 Although these alternative value sources may not fully answer
questions raised in antitrust debates, Sullivan reasoned they would at least
"" Remarks of Ky P. Ewing, Jr., Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division,
before the Fifth Annual Symposium on Antitrust Law, The Southwestern Legal Foundation,
Dallas, Texas, on May 9, 1980. [1980] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 55,936.
"9 Id. at 55,936, 55,937.
260 See, e.g. , Baumol, supra note 17; Scherer, supra note 17; Williamson, supra note 17.
261 See note 115 supra and Baumol, supra note 17.
262 Sullivan, supra note 137.
262 Joskow, supra note 1.
264 Sullivan, supra note 137, at 1232, 1241.
165 See id. at 1232, 1241, 1242.
266 Id. at 1232.
267 Set id. at 1232-41.
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supply a "healthy skepticism" about the limited analysis drawn solely from
economics . 268
In a similar vein Sullivan also argued that traditional legal rules focusing on
"human animus," or underlying intent, were more appropriate for a legal
system than rules solely used to perform an economic evaluation . 269 A firm
seeking to exclude rivals by selling at unremunerative prices would leave
traces."° Sullivan contended that pretrial discovery procedures can uncover
these traces, and that these traces would be easier to prove than the pricing
conduct that Areeda and Turner would require to prove predation."' Under
Sullivan's more traditional legal approach to predation either side would be free
to present objective economic data such as that stressed by Areeda and
Turner,272 but in addition any evidence indicative of predatory intent also could
be presented. 273 This other, more subjective, evidence could include any traces
uncovered in pretrial discovery providing an insight to the defendant manage-
ment's perception about its market situation and the objectives it was trying to
achieve by its pricing policy. 274 The trier of fact then would review all of the
evidence and would apply an intent based standard of predation with a major
focus on these intra-firm perceptions . 2"
In Sullivan's view it is incorrect to replace a conventional formulation of
predation that looks for evil intent with a test focusing solely on economic
analysis. 276 Complete reliance on economic analysis, he argued, overestimated
the precision of the discipline of applied economics and underestimated the
potential of other more humanistic disciplines in general, and of the trier of fact
in particular, to discern predation."' Where predation occurs, Sullivan argued,
a predatory intent can be gleaned by the trier of fact when presented with all the
available evidence . "8
Sullivan's approach, however, is subject to the same criticisms Areeda and
Turner have leveled against historical treatment of predatory pricing claims.
While Sullivan correctly contends that standards such as the AVC rule are short-
sighted in their total reliance on economic analysis, he fails to propose guidelines
that delineate clearly what practices should constitute the offense of predatory
pricing. Although Sullivan would not call evidence based on cost analysis
irrelevant, he insists on a test primarily founded on intent. Theoretically, a
plaintiff could prevail without any showing of objective cost data to substantiate
its claim of predation. The emphasis placed on management perceptions and
objectives in pricing policy correctly highlights an important issue ignored by
268 Id. at 1241.
269 See id. at 1229.









276 Id. at 1230.
277
276 See id. at 1231.
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Areeda and Turner. Yet a firm that is uncertain whether a contemplated price
adjustment might be deemed predatory has no concrete guideline under the
Sullivan approach. Some degree of objective analysis is necessary to prevent a
firm from being found guilty of predation solely based on intra-firm memoranda
or over-zealous sales meetings that encourage employees to beat the competition
and drive them out of the market. Sullivan's alternative to the AVC rule, like
historical treatment of the issue, lacks this objective delineation of the
boundaries of predatory pricing.
B. A Two-Tier Economic Approach
The proposal of Professors Joskow and Klevorick is fundamentally dif-
ferent from Professor Sullivan's approach. It is the most recent in the line of
economic approaches that began with the Areeda and Turner article in 1975. 279
Their proposal consisted of a two-tier analytical framework. The first tier
entailed a structural analysis of the market, while the second tier examined
pricing behavior.
In the first tier, this structural analysis required that the relevant market be
placed on a continuum from monopoly markets to competitive markets.'"
Joskow and Klevorick proposed to rely on "generally accepted definitions of
monopoly power" 28 ' to accomplish this placement. In so doing, they identified
three categories of structural characteristics to aid in the placement of markets
on the continuum: (1) factors indicative of short-run monopoly power; (2)
conditions of entry into the market; and (3) the dynamic effects of competitors or
entrants on the costs of production and the quality of products offered to
consumers . 282 Positioning a market on this continuum allowed the court to
determine whether the market structure was such that "a dominant firm could
engage in predatory pricing activity that would result in significant sacrifice in
economic efficiency.' "" Joskow and Klevorick considered markets approaching
monopoly on the continuum to be most conducive to acts of predation.'"
Predatory pricing is more attractive in industries with increased monopoly char-
acteristics because the dominant firm will possess a greater ability to raise prices
after destroying its rival than would a firm in a competitive market with no
power to successfully raise prices.'- 85
 Thus, monopoly characteristics indicate a
greater net profitability of predatory pricing conduct than do competitive char-
acteristics.'" They further reasoned that because of the liklihood of success in a
conducive atmosphere the costs of a failure to identify predatory pricing conduct
would be highest in these markets.'" Therefore, a claim was to be pursued
279 See Baumol, Scherer, and Williamson, supra note 17. For a recent discussion of these
and other economic proposals, see McGee, supra note 17.
288 See Joskow, supra note 1, at 226.
201 Id. at 244.
282 Id. at 224.
283 Id. at 246.
264 See Joskow, supra note 1, at 244.
"5 See id. at 237.
286 See id. at 236.
267 See id. at 244-45.
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beyond the first tier only where the existence of monopoly characteristics, either
actual or potential, was pervasive enough to justify additional scrutiny. 288 This
would allow resources for antitrust enforcement to be targeted at those markets
where the cost of failure to locate predation and the propensity to act predatorily
are both high. Expenditure of resources here would produce the greatest social
efficiency gains. 289
The second tier of the test came into play when the first tier analysis
determined that the market possessed structural characteristics demonstrating
monopoly potentia1.29° This tier examined the defendant's pricing behavior and
compared price to cost. 291 Both subjective and objective evidence was con-
sidered. Three price ranges were analyzed and the legality of prices within these
ranges determined. First, prices found to be below AVC were determined to be
predatory per se. 292 Second, prices found to be between AVC and ATC were
determined to be predatory, unless they maximized short-run profits."' Third,
prices found to be above ATC were determined to be legal, unless a price reduc-
tion was reversed within an "unreasonable period of time ." 294 Evidence of
intent, if introduced, would solely be used to address two issues: (1) whether the
firm planned to increase prices once competition had been driven from the
market, and (2) whether the pricing conduct was an effort to increase artificially
the difficulty of entering the market. 295 At this tier the burden of production
would be on the defendant. 296
Joskow and Klevorick justified the rule for each price range in the second
tier of the test individually. For the first price range, prices below AVC, they
found, as had Areeda and Turner, that a showing of prices within this range was
sufficient to demonstrate predation."' This conclusion, unlike Areeda and
Turner's similar conclusion, however, was not based on microeconomic models
or short run efficiency considerations. 298 Rather, they reached this conclusion by
looking to long run intent and consequences. 299 They reasoned that a price cut to
this level could have no purpose other than sacrifice of short run profits for long
run monopoly gain. 300
Joskow and Klevorick deemed prices set between AVC and ATC• to be
predatory unless the defendant could show that this strategy maximized short
run profits."' They concluded that this defense would only be valid when
' Id. at 245.
" Id. at 262.




" Id. at 252.
293 Id. at 253.
294 Id. at 255.
295
	 at 261.
296 Id. at 259.
297 Id. at 252.
29' Id.
299 Id.
'°° Id. at 251. They recognized one possible exception, where there is temporary excess
capacity and shutting down would involve high cost to resume production. Id. at 252 n.77.
3°' Id. at 253.
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substantial excess production capacity existed in the industry.'" Generally,
however, a price below ATC was deemed to be predatory because a firm pricing
at this level could drive equally and even more efficient competitors, as well as
less efficient competitors, from the market or deter their entry."'
Finally, in viewing prices set above ATC, Joskow and Klevorick concluded
a price reduction to any point above ATC should be legal, unless it was
rescinded within an unreasonable time. 304 They reached this conclusion because
prices above ATC were sustainable and, therefore, if they were maintained they
were not usually short-run predatory attempts to cement monopoly power."' If
the price reduction was reversed within a short time, perhaps two years,
however, predatory intent is suggested and the defendant would be required to
show that the new price was justified by independent increases in cost or
demand to avoid liability. 306
The shifted burden of production was required because Joskow and
Klevorick reasoned it would be difficult or impossible for the plaintiff or the
court to ascertain the defendant's real costs."' Any cost-based test would create
a tremendous evidentiary burden on a plaintiff, and cost evidence obtained
through discovery may be incomplete or difficult to understand.'" Therefore,
the defendant should logically bear the burden of showing that the price cut was
not predatory. This would include provision of cost studies, as well as detailed
descriptions of the bases of cost studies and accounting techniques employed in
developing cost estimates . 3 " The failure to maintain or produce this
information would lead to the presumption that the price cut was predatory. 31 )
With regard to the second tier, Joskow and Klevorick only subjected a firm
to scrutiny where the structural analysis indicated that there was a reasonable
expectation that monopoly power had been or could be sustained through price
reductions.'" Because of the showing of monopoly potential in the first tier, their
proposed second-tier analysis was more rigorous than would be applied to all
firms by Areeda and Turner.'" Thus, a firm's pricing conduct found acceptable
to Areeda and Turner would not always be legal under this test. 313
302 They noted that this condition might arise for three reasons: (1) the firm was in a
declining industry; (2) an entrant entered at a sufficiently large scale of production that price equal
to ATC left industry capacity underutilized; (3) the price-cutting firm followed a strategy of carry-
ing excess capacity to deter entry. If one of the first two situations obtained, the price-cutting firm
could use this defense to justify prices below ATC. If, however, the third reason accurately
described the situation, this defense would not be available to the firm, and its below-ATC price
would be illegal. Id.
"3 Id.





3" Id. at 261.
3 " Id.
3" See id. at 249 & n.69.
312 See id. at 244.
513 See id. at 252-55.
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Joskow and Klevorick's proposal, while improving upon previous cost-
based tests in its second tier, is an impractical test to apply in a courtroom.
Although it may be theoretically valid, the first tier would necessitate detailed
and complex industry analysis. In using terms like "generally accepted defini-
tions of monopoly,power," 314 Joskow and Klevorick mislead the reader into con-
cluding that a structural analysis of this type is a uniformly agreed on, relatively
simple task . 3 ' 5 As noted by a recent commentator, this proposal would make
every predation case into what amounts to a major industry study followed by a
section 2 Sherman Act case. 3 t 6
Beyond the fatal impracticality of this first-tier requirement, however,
Joskow and Klevorick make three valid points in the second-tier explanation.
First, shifting the focus from the short run economic efficiency emphasis of the
AVC rule to long run intent and consequences is an improvement. As noted by
Professor Sullivan, antitrust law is not grounded solely in economics, 31 and this
approach takes this fact into account. Second, the choice of ATC as the crucial
point in determining predation also is an improvement over Areeda and
Turner's approach. The realization that equally efficient and even more
efficient firms can be forced out of the market or dissuaded from entry at a price
below ATC supports this choice. Finally, placing the burden of production on
the defendant with regard to evidence necessary to establish a cost-price rela-
tionship is entirely logical since the defendant is likely to have sole control over
such data.
The Sullivan and Joskow/Klevorick proposals for alternative approaches to
predatory pricing stem from how the commentators view the AVC approach.
Some of these problems may be non-economic — such as a lack of focus on
intent — or economic — such as incorrect cost-price comparison point. These
proposals, however, have problems themselves. The Sullivan approach, for
example, because of its subjectivity, provides no objective guideline for a firm to
follow in setting prices. Meanwhile, the Joskow/Klevorick approach is unsatis-
factory because it is too complex to be practical. Nevertheless, courts, in the
future, will have to account for factors that the AVC rule ignores by adopting a
legal standard for predatory pricing that is practically applicable as well as
theoretically valid.
IV. WANTED: A SUCCESSOR TO THE AVC RULE
Due to the deficiencies of the AVC rule, and the total inadequacy of any
historical formulation of the offense, predatory pricing is a violation in search of
a standard. Whether or not it is indeed a frequent occurrence, courts and
businesses alike need a concrete legal standard for the offense to guide them in
detecting or avoiding illegal conduct. An approach that built upon the require-
ment of objective data, which Areeda and Turner correctly pointed out as
lacking in earlier analysis, while not ignoring other evidence relevant to
" 4 See id. at 244.
McGee, supra note 17, at 319.
"6
 Id. at 320.
3 ' 7 Sullivan, supra note 137, at 1232.
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predation should avoid the pitfalls of the AVC rule and clearly delineate the
boundaries of the legal pricing conduct.
A. Factors Relevant to a Standard for Predatory Pricing
Examination of the AVC rule and proposed alternatives has produced a list
of four major characteristics that should be embodied in a valid legal approach
for identifying predatory pricing. Initially, a new approach should further the
policies inherent in the Sherman Act, while also establishing an objective
guideline for acceptable pricing conduct. Additionally it should be a practical
approach capable of easy application to business and competitive realities.
Further, it should attempt to foster both long-run competition and efficiency.
Finally, any valid legal standard should be based on data and practices that the
judiciary can understand and examine through traditional legal analysis.
First, like the Sherman Act, a standard for predation should recognize
values other than economic efficiency: 318 Competition from new entrants and
small producers should not be put at a disadvantage greater than their inherent
cost disadvantage. Price reduction with the aim of driving these competitors out
of business should be identified as predatory. In this respect, the reasons behind
a price reduction are as relevant as the price level after the reduction in deter-
mining the predation. For this reason, a legal standard for the Sherman Act
offense should consider managerial intentions and reasons for reducing its price
rather than only examining the resulting price and its relationship to economic
costs. While a flexible approach is therefore necessary, some sort of objective
cutoff delineating which price reductions are suspect should be established.
Firms need an objective guideline on which they can safely rely on in making
pricing decisions. Without some cutoff point any price reduction would be open
to a rival's charge of predation, even when the new price covered all costs of
production and resulted in larger profits, both short-run and long-run, due to
increased sales. Although it is theoretically possible to engage in predation by
any reduction in price, practical realities dictate that prices set above some point
be conclusively presumed legal.
Second, a standard for predation must be practical and examine actual
business realities . 3 '' The standard should look to business practices, not
economic theory for its rationale and application. While economic costs may
conceptually be a superior way to recognize an item's value, only accounting
costs are expressed in business records. Therefore, any practical standard
should focus on accounting costs, not on economic costs, both in its theoretical
analysis and in its practical application. Further, the analysis should not be
premised on the theoretical model of perfect competition. For textbooks, this
premise may be warranted, but for a legal examination of predation, the
standard should reflect the realities of business in the less than perfectly
competitive market. It is based on these real conditions that a manager will
make the decision to reduce price.
313
 See text and notes at notes 135-51 supra.
314 See text and notes at notes 152-55 & 161-68 supra.
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Third, the standard should recognize both efficiency and competition as
long-run concepts. 323 New entrants and small producers should be encouraged
to realize the efficiency gain and cost reductions available to them through
increased cumulative production. This will increase effective competition in the
long run. In order to remain in business over the long run all costs must be
covered. With this long-run concept in mind, the standard should allow short-
run deviations from this full-cost coverage only for legitimate and legal business
purposes. Perhaps most firms charging below ATC will have a legitimate reason
for this pricing, but this should be demonstrated, not presumed. Deviation for
any other reason serves only to discourage competition from firms without equal
financial staying power. While recognizing the inherent disadvantages of new
and smaller producers, these disadvantages should not be accentuated by a rule
stressing the short-run while ignoring long-run consequences.
Fourth, the standard should be capable of easy and correct application in
the courtroom.321 An analysis of predation should be based on traditional legal
analysis. The standard should rely on an analysis of the firm's conduct that is
capable of examination in court, not on theoretical economic analysis. The
judiciary is comfortable with legal concepts while normally untrained in
economic theory. Firms should be required to justify their conduct based on
legitimate business realities, not on theoretical analysis. This coupled with the
use of readily available business figures should result in a standard more suited
for the legal examination of a Sherman Act offense. Therefore, a valid standard
should be based on accounting costs rather than economic costs and take into
account the discretion involved in formulating these costs. Beyond this price
reductions should be evaluated in light of the realities of the business place with
ample flexibility to recognize what are legitimate justifications for reducing price
and what are illegal attempts to destroy competition in the context of the
Sherman Act. Only with these four factors in mind can the optimal predatory
pricing test be devised.
B. A Proposal: A Standard Based on Accounting Records and
Managerial Practices
The foregoing factors can be taken into account in the formulation of a two-
step analysis for evaluating allegations of predatory pricing. As a first step, for
ease of administration and to give businesses an objective guideline, the test
would avail itself of an accounting, cost-based cutoff in establishing a
presumption of predation. Firms setting prices above this level would receive no
further scrutiny. Where price is set below this level, the court would proceed to
the second step and examine the defendant's managerial practices.
Step one would involve a consideration of full costs. Under this step the
court would designate any price set above the accountant's figure for ATC as
tegaj . 322 A price shown to be below ATC would raise the presumption of
"° See text and notes at notes 169-82 supra.
32 ' See text and notes at notes 185.96 supra.
"' Other commentators proposing economic cost-based approaches have used ATC as
the significant cutoff for identifying predatory pricing. Joskow, supra note 1, at 252-55;
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predatory pricing conduct. Firms pricing below this point would face the second
step of the test. Step two would involve an examination of the defendant's
managerial practices to ascertain if legitimate business reasons exist for this
pricing conduct. If a legitimate justification for this pricing is not shown, the
defendant would be guilty of predation.
The first step of this approach examines accounting costs as opposed to
economic costs, thereby avoiding the problems encountered by courts in
applying an economic cost-based theory such as the AVC rule. 323 ATC was
chosen because it is the firm's breakeven point. At prices above this point, a sale
of the product causes an addition to profits, not just a reduction in losses or a
contribution toward fixed costs. Moreover, subsidization of the production
process does not occur above this point, as no losses exist to be subsidized by
revenue from a source other than sale of the product. Where the defendant
continues to profit from the sale of the product, competition is on the basis of
legitimate cost differences, fully covered by price, not on the basis of the amount
of financial reserves a firm has available to subsidize sales. Therefore, it is
reasonable to assume that this price is legitimately competitive rather than
predatory.
To establish this cutoff, the court would accept the defendant's ATC as
indicated in its business records. Although this figure is subject to some mani-
pulation, 324
 it would be accepted for several reasons. First, so long as the appor-
tionment methods are generally accepted accounting practices, there is no way a
court could decide logically which of several accepted methods is "correct ." 325
Second, although indirect expenses still may be allocated among several
products in various ways resulting in different ATC figures, far less variance is
possible in determining ATC than in determining AVC. When computing ATC
Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Business Machines Corp., 481 F. Supp. at 995-96.
The approach in this note, however, uses an accounting ATC figure. Economic ATC includes
normal profits, or the returns necessary to attract the requisite capital to the business. This oppor-
tunity cost is not identified in business records, therefore the only readily available ATC figure
found in business records is an accounting figure.
"' See text and notes at notes 152-68, supra.
324
 Problems exist in allocating indirect fixed costs, such as management expenses or
facilities overhead not directly traceable to any one product. Any accounting method must, some-
what arbitrarily, allocate these expenses in ascertaining the full cost of production. Although the
costs must be consistently allocated to the products, the potential for manipulation, through
allocating more of these indirect costs to one product and less to another, does exist. See ANTHONY,
supra note 152, at 504-16. In single-product firms, the ATC is, of course, not subject to these
allocation problems since all costs are traceable to the product. For multi-product firms, however,
these allocation problems are present. See joskow, supra note 1, at 252 n.79. Joskow and Klevorick
followed Baumol in defining ATC for the multi-product firm as "average incremental cost" of the
relevant product. Id. Baumol defines the "average incremental cost" of the product as the firm's
total cost for all products minus what the firm's total cost would be without the product, divided by
the number of units of the relevant product produced. Baumol, supra note 17, at 9 n.26. The
author of this note does not, however, propose that the court enter into the complex calculations
necessary to attain such a figure. Any resulting figure would also be of necessity imprecise and
only speculative unless the firm actually did stop producing the product. Instead, the defendant's
figure for ATC, easily obtainable, will be used. See note 326 infra.
325 See Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Business Machines Corp., 481 F.
Supp. at 998-1001.
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arbitrary determinations of fixed or variable cost would not effect any figure for
total costs. Therefore, the opportunity for manipulation is greatly reduced. As a
result, accepting the defendant's accounting ATC figure, so long as its
accounting practices have been consistently applied, is a relatively safe way of
ascertaining the cost of production . 326 Accounting ATC, unlike economic ATC,
does not include a return on investment or profits necessary to attract equity
capital."' Thus, since accounting ATC is always higher than any measure of
AVC, a standard using accounting ATC as a cutoff is harsher on price cutters
than one using AVC, while at the same time, allowing lower prices and, there-
fore, being more lenient on price cutters than a standard using economic
ATC 328
A price below ATC brings the second step of the proposal into play. Pricing
below ATC would require a response from the defendant, and the burden of
production shifts to the defendant to justify its pricing conduct. 329 Under step
two the court examines the managerial practices underlying the defendant's
pricing conduct. The defendant could rebut the presumption of predation estab-
lished in step one by demonstrating a legitimate business reason for such
conduct. There are four reasons, any one of which, if established, would justify
setting price below the firm's current ATC. The first justification is liquidation
of excess inventory, obsolete merchandise, or an entire product line. 3" These
actions, if not taken repeatedly, would be legal."' The second justification is
severe excess capacity in the industry. 332 The third justification is matching a
competitor's price that was below the defendant's ATC . 333 The fourth justifica-
326 This inclusion is justified because accounting practices are usually consistent through-
out the life of a product, suggesting no intention on the part of the firm to protect any given
product at any specific time and thereby avoid potential antitrust actions for predatory pricing.
Consequently the burden rests on the defendant to show that the allocation method has been
applied consistently. Absent such proof of consistency, or where a change has been made in
allocation methods shortly before the price reduction resulting in a price above the average total
cost using the new method and below average total cost using the old method, the court should
proceed to step two to further scrutinize the defendant's pricing conduct. Generally speaking, it
would be highly unlikely that a multi-product firm would change their allocation methods with
antitrust avoidance in mind. First, it would be difficult for a firm to precisely determine the
products to be protected with an artificially low accountant's cost. Second, it would be
undesireable to burden the firm's remaining products with as artificially high price, above the
actual cost of production. See note 324 supra.
322 See text and note at note 41 supra.
"a Where only accounting data exists, it is impractical to attempt to add to ATC a figure
representing the normal return on investment necessary to attract capital, as any such computa-




33° See Williamson, supra note 17, at 317-18; Transamerica Computer Co. v. International
Business Machines Corp., 481 F. Supp. at 996.
"' Sec text and note at note 335 infra.
332 See Joskow, supra note 1, at 253; Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Business
Machines Corp., 481 F. Supp. at 996.
333 This justification would only allow a Firm, A, to match, not beat, competitor B's price
which was below A's average total price. Once B moved its price up, A would have to follow, it
could not remain at the lower (sub-ATC) price when B raised its price. Though this may well be
detrimental to a third competitor, C, who could not match the low price, this situation is
competition on the merits. The prohibition of such conduct would be detrimental both to competi-
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tion is a planned increase in the defendant's production capacity that, when
complete, will lower ATC. For this final justification to be legal, the below-ATC
price must be (1) set in an effort to increase volume to meet new production
capacity, and (2) reasonably expected to cover ATC when the new production
capacity is added.
Liquidation, the first justification, is a legitimate, non-predatory reason for
lowering prices below ATC. Predatory pricing requires short-run reduction of
price to drive competition out of the product market in an effort to gain profits in
the market via higher long-run prices. 334
 Managerial practices indicating
liquidation of obsolete merchandise or of an entire product line are by definition
non-predatory. In these situations the firm is either ridding itself of an obsolete
product, or model, or removing itself entirely from production of the item. In
either event, the firm is not absorbing short-run losses in the hope of larger
market share and profits in the long run because it will not even be producing
these products in the long run. Rather, it is selling obsolete or discontinued
merchandise at a price designed to quickly and permanently liquidate all
remaining inventory of the product. Short-run losses indeed may be sustained,
but the long-run benefit consists solely of minimizing inventory or product
write-off expenses, not of making profits from the product. Similarly, price
cutting to liquidate excess inventory is legitimate and non-predatory, so long as
this conduct is not a sham utilized on a regular basis to drive competitors out of
the market. 335
Severe excess capacity in the price-cutting firm due to declining demand or
overexpansion of the industry, the second justification, is another legitimate,
non-predatory reason for lowering price below ATC. A firm in a declining
industry may incur excess capacity because of a decrease in demand for the
product. This lowered demand can be satisfied by much less industry capacity,
thereby forcing many existing firms out of the industry. Managerial practices
indicating a desire to remain a producer in a declining industry is a legitimate
reason for the pricing conduct. Where it is inevitable that some firms will be
forced out of the industry, the conduct of cutting prices may be the only
alternative open to a firm desiring to remain. Although competitors will be
ruined, the motivation behind the conduct is self-preservation, not predation. 336
Lion and consumers. Of course, in the example above, if B moved its price below its average total
cost without justification, B would be liable to suit by either A or C.
3" See text at note 2 supra.
'" There is no set time period to define "regularly" in this context. It is, however,
suggested that if such liquidation of inventory through sub-ATC prices took place within 24
months after a previous liquidation it should be considered illegal, based on anti-competitive
motives. Where a liquidation took place 48 months or more after any previous liquidation, it
should, perhaps, be considered legal absent a showing of anti-competitive intent. Other situations
would warrant a case-by-case examination where the intervening time fell within these two
bounds. Another instance of illegal conduct, regardless of the intervening time, would be the
situation where excess inventory is the result of planned over-production with the goal of building
inventory to justify a sub-ATC liquidation aimed at destroying rivals.
"6
 To claim this justification, the defendant would initially have to show two objective
facts before introducing subjective evidence that the pricing conduct was motivated by the desire
to remain in the industry. The defendant would first have to show that the industry was declining
and, second, that defendant itself had excess capacity in a main product line. Showing the first of
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A similar situation of excess capacity causing legitimate price cuts may exist
when a new entrant has entered the industry at a very large scale of produc-
tion:337
Competitors pricing below defendant's ATC, the third justification, is also
a legitimate, non-predatory reason for reducing price below this point.
Managerial practices indicating that the desire to match a rival's price was the
reason for the pricing conduct are legitimate and show competition on the
merits. Pricing at this level may not be a viable long-run business strategy, but
there should be no legal restriction on this conduct, so long as it only matches a
rival's price. 338 Regardless of the legality of the rival's price, this should be
deemed legal and non-predatory as it enhances competition. Furthermore, if the
rival's price is unjustifiably below its ATC the rival should be open to suit by
matching firm and liable for any losses sustained on the resulting below ATC
sales . 339
Planned increase in production capacity lowering ATC, the fourth justi-
these facts, a declining industry, could be difficult if reliance was placed on trade journals or
testimony of competitors. Both of these sources, to some extent, may be unreliable. Trade journals
are only as accurate as the information provided to them and in any event may be slow in
acknowledging that an industry was declining. Competitors may be unwilling to classify the
industry as declining in this situation as such testimony would allow defendant to price below
ATC, and it is likely, if this is a declining industry, that the competitors too are out to survive so
their testimony may in fact be more self-serving than accurate. For these reasons, the author
suggests that the court rely on Commerce Department figures for the industry and require a
showing of declining sales for three consecutive years prior to the price cut as an objective showing
of a declining industry. This may be attacked as arbitrary, but it is a neutral source providing a
practical and objective basis for classification which would not require a complex in-court industry
study.
Next, the defendant would have to show that it was affected by this decline by showing it had
excess capacity. If it was operating without severe excess capacity prior to the price cut, there was
no legitimate reason to cut prices to remain a viable producer as sufficient demand was existent at
higher prices. Such a showing would require defendant to introduce sales and capacity figures for
the three years preceding the price cut corresponding to the Commerce Department figures above.
In these years, to rely on this justification, defendant cannot have substantially increased capacity
thereby producing the excess. The excess must result from decreased demand — a factor not
subject to the defendant's control — so sales must have declined. Additionally, the product must
be a main product line of the defendant. If it did not account for a significant portion of
defendant's sales dollars, perhaps 15%, the firm is not likely to be dependent on it and therefore
has no legitimate business reason to incur losses on it as a necessity for survival. The potential for
illegal subsidization of the product increases as the amount of overall sales represented by the
product decreases, since the product is not relied on as a major source of defendant's business
revenues.
)" In this situation the defendant would have to show that a new entrant to the industry
within the three years prior to the price cut had sales equal to one of the largest firms in the industry
prior to its entry. Then the defendant would have to show that following this entry the defendant
experienced excess capacity. This showing would be the same as that required as the second
objective fact in note 336 supra.
3 " See note 333 supra.
939 It would not be acceptable to allow a firm to match only a rival's legal price. First,
without a trial there would be no feasible way to ascertain if the rival's price was legally justified.
Second, by the time the rival was tried and found guilty, or an injunction was granted, the original
firm may be forced out of the market or even out of business. Damages at this point may come too
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fication, is the final legitimate, non-predatory reason for reducing price below
ATC. In order to rebut the presumption of predation using the fourth justifica-
tion, the defendant must show managerial practices based on several factors.
First, the defendant must introduce evidence of long-range plans indicating the
intention of increasing production capacity. Second, evidence of action taken on
these plans must be introduced.'" Third, after the passage of a period of time
which would allow a firm to complete the contemplated increase in capacity, 34 '
production per period 342 must be higher, ATC must be lower, and price must
cover ATC . 343
This justification utilizes a long-run perspective and can be understood
more readily by employing the concept of an experience curve . 344 An experience
curve demonstrates how an experienced producer can operate at costs lower
than a new entrant, and why a large producer enjoys economies of scale relative
"° The plans must have been acted upon. Action would include out of pocket expenses
normally expected to be required to implement the plans. In other words, the plans cannot be
merely stated, or be in the official records without any action having been undertaken to complete
them, if this justification is to be used.
" 1
 This time is the amount of time it would take a firm committed to carrying out such a
plan to have completed the capacity expansion and bring the new production on line. This will
necessarily have to be established through expert testimony, which could be offered by both parties
to attempt to establish a time period, or at least give the trier of fact evidence on which it can
determine a reasonable time, given the expansion planned and any other relevant factors.
342
 Sales per period indicates sales figures for a relevant period of time, e.g., a week,
month, or year.
34 ' If a defendant shows action taken on the plans, but not dropping costs due to problems
in bringing the new capacity on line, the court should allow time to correct the problem. If after the
continuance, no further problems exist, but average total cost is still above price, the product is
being subsidized by the firm and predatory conduct should be presumed.
"' The experience curve was a name applied to overall cost behavior by the Boston Con-
sulting Group (BCG) in the late 1960's. It can best be understood if thought of graphically. Costs
in dollars are plotted on the y-axis against cumulative production in units on the x-axis. This can
be illustrated (using logarithmic coordinates) as follows:
Chart II
10	 20	 40	 80 Cumulative Production
The cost is measured in constant dollars over time, deflated to take inflation into account. The
costs reflected are cash-flow figures obtained from cash-flow records prepared by a firm for use in
business planning. This avoids decisions such as variable- or fixed-cost classifications and de-
ferred-recognition-of-cash-expenditures problems, both inherent to accounting figures. Through
the benefits of learning, specialization, investment, and scale of production, costs are shown to
decline between 20 and 30 percent with every doubling of cumulative production. See Chart II
supra. The experience curve, however, contradicts many basic assumptions of classical economics.
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to a small producer."' It takes into account what is known as the experience
effect. This shows that cost decreases by a fixed percentage with each doubling
of production."' This effect is widely acknowledged in production economics
and has been demonstrated in many industries."' Cost is compared to
cumulative production, with a representation of ATC that declines with
increased production .348
Under the fourth justification, if no intention to increase production
capacity in the form of long-range plans is shown, or if plans are shown but no
action has been taken on them, then there is no valid reason for pricing at this
level, and predation would be assumed. The time of the original price reduction
could be labeled T 1 . The reasonable period of time to advance down the experi-
ence curve far enough to lower ATC to the level of price would be established by
expert testimony. Thus, T1 plus this reasonable period would equal a new point
in time that could be labeled T2. 349 By time T2 defendant must show the requisite
increase in cumulative production that would have been anticipated at time T1
in order to lower ATC so that price covers full cost. 35° This increase in produc-
grows it will take increasingly long to achieve the benefits accruing from a doubling of production.
The curve also shows why all competitors cannot have similar cost functions. A firm can cut
costs by working down its experience curve through increased capacity and volume sales. As this
occurs, costs decrease so prices can be reduced while still covering current or reasonably
foreseeable total costs. Competition is increased in an effort to proceed down the curve, by cutting
the firm's costs while providing consumers with the benefit of lower price. If pricing conduct is a
legitimate effort to proceed down the curve and to cover total costs that are shortly achievable
through increased capacity and cumulative production, it should be allowed. See CONLEY,
EXPERIENCE CURVES AS A PLANNING TOOL (1970); BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP,
PERSPECTIVES ON EXPERIENCE (1972); BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, THE EXPERIENCE.
CURVE I-IV (1973-74).
"5 The experience curve is related to the learning curve effect. BOSTON CONSULTING
GROUP, THE EXPERIENCE CURVE II — HISTORY (1973-74). The learning effect is an established
principle that shows the direct labor hours and, therefore, costs, required to perform a task
decrease by approximately 15 percent for each doubling of performance. See ANTHONY, supra note
152, at 642-44.
"6 This is so when measured in constant, inflation-adjusted dollars.
"' E.g., high technology (Texas Instruments), steam turbine generators (Westinghouse,
GE, Allis-Chalmers), integrated circuits (total industry), and polyvinylchloride (industry data),
among others. BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, THE EXPERIENCE CURVE I-V (1973-74).
345
Cumulative Production
39 For example, if T, was January 1981 and the reasonable period is found by the trier of
fact, based on expert testimony, to be 18 months, T, would be July 1982.
35° By reviewing past predatory pricing cases, any reasonable period less than 3 or 4 years
should present no problem for the courts, as it takes that long to get to trial so the relevant figures
should be part of historical data.
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tion and resulting progression down the experience curve would be shown either
by increased sales or inventory buildup."'
If the fourth justification is relied on, the defendant must show that it
progressed down, or is progressing down, its experience curve. If this is shown,
the price reduction will be deemed to cover reasonably foreseeable ATC. In this
situation, absent other evidence or direct proof of predatory intent, the pricing
conduct would be deemed non-predatory and, thus, legal.
Managerial practices that could not be shown to justify the below ATC
price level based on any of these four legitimate non-predatory reasons would
indicate predation. Additionally, where the defendant establishes one of these
justifications to rebut the presumption of predation, the plaintiff may, of course,
introduce evidence to overcome the rebuttal. This would include introduction of
any direct evidence of predatory intent. 352 If the defendant's presentation of
managerial practices cannot establish one of the four justifications for its pricing
conduct, or if the trier of fact determines that the plaintiff successfully overcame
the defendant's efforts to show a legitimate business reason, the defendant
would be found in violation of the antitrust statutes prohibiting predatory pric-
ing. Defendant would then be liable for any damages to competitors resulting
from its illegal pricing conduct.
C. Rationale Behind Proposal
The establishment of a cost-based cutoff in step one is justified by adminis-
trative convenience. Step one allows a "free-zone" above ATC where pricing
conduct will not be analyzed. The first reason for this "free-zone" is the
difficulty in attempting to separate predatory price reductions from legitimate,
competitive price reductions where the post-reduction price still yields an
accounting profit. 3" This separation would for all practical purposes be impos-
sible, and considering the existence of profits at this level coupled with the
detriment to consumers by forcing these prices and profits even higher, would be
a very dubious goal to seek. A second, and perhaps equally compelling reason
for the cutoff, is to set an objective guideline that businesses can apply
confidently in their pricing decisions. This objectivity is lacking under a tradi-
tional intent-based standard. Finally, at a price equal to or above ATC the pro-
duction process is not being subsidized, instead its costs are fully covered, so the
likelihood that the price is set for reasons other than that of making a current
profit is minimal.
"l This inventory buildup may not be legally liquidated at any price below the new ATC.
352 Direct evidence of predatory intent behind the price reduction may be introduced. It is
unlikely, however, that such clear "tracks" frequently will be available to overcome these justifi-
cations. See joskow, supra note 1, at 259; Sullivan, supra note 137 at 1230-31.
"3 Similar to other proposals, this cost-based approach finds the free-zone argument
persuasive although the actual cutoff point employed is different. This difference stems from this
proposal's use of accounting cost rather than economic cost (which includes "normal profit" or
opportunity cost) in determining the cutoff point. See Areeda, supra note 4, at 704-09; Trans-
america Computer Co. v. International Business Machines Corp., 481 F. Supp. at 989-91. The
average total cost is the breakeven point, where out-of-pocket expenses for the necessary inputs,
fixed and variable, equal gross revenues generated by the product. The argument in favor of a
specific point for a cutoff is the same as the argument against a solely intent-based approach;
businesses must be able to assess the legality of their plans against an objective standard.
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Step two allows the analysis of the defendant's managerial practices, the
intentions behind the pricing conduct. This provides for more flexibility than a
solely cost-based approach. Therefore, other 'Policy considerations of the
Sherman Act and any business justifications that may exist for a manager to sell
products below their full cost of production may be considered. The shifted
burden of production at this step should facilitate the presentation of intrafirm
perceptions of the reason for the price reduction, 354 such as long-range plans,
memoranda, and pricing strategy goals. A manager will not price below ATC
without some strategic reason. An examination of managerial practices will not
only take into account economic or accounting principles suggesting a price
level. Instead, managerial practices leading to a price reduction are business
judgments based on several factors: production economics, management
accounting, 355 as well as the firm's long-range goal or strategy. 356 It is this
combination of factors that an examination of managerial practices will
consider. Step two would be flexible enough to allow the trier of fact to ascertain
whether the firm's reasons for the price cut are legitimate, legal business justifi-
cations or predatory.
If the below-ATC prices are to be found legal, the defendant's presentation
of managerial practices must demonstrate that any subsidization is justified by
legitimate, legal business goals. If this cannot be shown, • the defendant's
conduct setting prices at a level not covering the full costs of production will be
deemed predatory. The strategies of (1) liquidating excess or obsolete inventory,
(2) attempting to become one of the producers who remain in a declining
industry, (3) matching a rival's price, or (4) building volume to sustain
increased production and lower ATC are all legitimate and legal goals. The
antitrust laws are aimed to protect competition, not competitors. Therefore, it is
immaterial that adherence to any of these strategies may be detrimental to a
competitor, so long as it is not injurious to competition. If there is a legitimate,
non-predatory justification for the defendant's conduct it should be legal. But
any subsidization not justified by these legitimate business goals results in com-
petition on the basis of financial reserves alone, and should not be legal.
In summary, this proposal meets the four criteria of a valid legal approach
to predatory pricing. First, this test looks beyond economics to other values
inherent in the Sherman Act. When price does not cover the full cost of produc-
tion, the reasons and intentions behind pricing conduct are examined. Competi-
tion based on the size of a firm's financial reserves available to subsidize sales
and drive a less wealthy producer out of business is not legalized. Similarly, the
inherent cost advantage of established or larger firms is not allowed to be
accentuated, and protection of competition from new or small firms, therefore,
is increased. Second, this test utilizes actual business realities, not theoretical
models. Accounting costs that are readily available are used in the test. Rather
"4 Sullivan, supra note 137, at 1232.
3" See ANTHONY, supra note 152, at 457-77.
356 Both welfare and intent factors are included in the purview of managerial practices.
The intent of the firm in deciding to cut prices is definitely relevant. Managerial practices result in
action undertaken to further or achieve the firm's long-run goals. When the situation is assessed in
these terms, the court can evaluate the welfare (long-run) implications of the pricing strategy than
it could if only short-term consequences are focused upon.
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than comparing reality to a non-existent industry that is perfectly competitive,
actual pricing stretegy and the practical business reasons behind it are
examined. Third, in requiring price to cover full cost, except in several short run
situations facing the firm, the test recognizes both efficiency and competition as
long-run concepts. While pricing below ATC in the short run is recognized as
legitimate in several situations, this test takes into account that a firm must cover
full costs to remain in the industry in the long run. Additionally, the experience
curve allows variations for cost decreases achieved over time. Finally, the test is
capable of easy and correct application in a courtroom. Accounting ATC, sales,
inventory, and cumulative production figures are readily available. If used, the
experience curve must be introduced by the defendant . 3 " Further, the
examination of managerial practices and any evidence of predatory intent takes
the form of a traditional legal rule focusing on human conduct and the reasons
behind the action. Such a test recognizes the values inherent in the antitrust laws
and allows judges and juries to address the issue of predatory pricing with a
familiar type of legal analysis that examines a firm's conduct in the context of
practical business realities.
CONCLUSION
The controversial Areeda and Turner AVC rule is not an acceptable
approach to predatory pricing. While it served the purpose of focusing attention
on a more rational view of the offense, it excluded or misinterpreted important
factors to be considered when determining predation. Academic critics have
continually attacked the AVC rule. More recently, the courts too have begun to
question the AVC rule and have indicated a desire to refine it, reject it, or make
it only one of several factors considered relevant. In this academic and judicial
retreat from the AVC rule, necessary attributes of future approaches have
become evident. Predatory pricing is not solely an economic or cost-based
phenomenon. It cannot be viewed only in economic terms, isolated from the
managerial practices underlying the price reduction. These managerial
practices must be examined, and if they do not indicate a strategy conforming to
legally justifiable goals, the firm should be found guilty of predation.
CHARLES PURINTON SHIMER
357
 Progression down the experience curve can be verified by looking at the firm's costs. If
the defendant claims the slope of the curve is steep, in order to show the legality of the price reduc-
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